Interaction and Autonomy

How the Ethical Value of an Artwork Can Affect Its Artistic Value

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that anyone committed to the normative ideal of the autonomy of art should adopt a moderate moralist position in the artistic-ethical interaction debate. I begin by briefly presenting two prominent interactionist arguments: Noël Carroll’s moderate moralist “uptake argument” and Berys Gaut’s radical moralist “merited response argument”. These arguments have largely failed to persuade participants in the debate. According to Louise Hanson (2013, 209), this is because “all parties to the debate have tacitly accepted a set of constraints which prejudices the issue against the interactionist”—namely, the Indirectedness Condition and the Qua Constraint. Hanson argues that the interactionist must reject the former. However, while I agree with Hanson’s diagnosis, I contend that the direct strategy she proposes is not a viable path for an interactionist advocate of artistic autonomy. Rather, I argue that the moderate moralist who is sensitive to the (relative) autonomy of art should instead reject the Qua Constraint.