Between Autonomy and Obstruction
A Theoretical Framework for Constitutional Court Independence
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.55019/plr.2026.1.35-53Kulcsszavak:
constitutional courts, judicial independence, appointment models, thwarting strategy, court-packing, legitimacy algorithmAbsztrakt
This study analyzes the structuaral vulnerabilities of constitutional courts operating between legal doctrine and political power. Protecting constitutional adjudication requiers a dual layer of safeguards: institutional autonomy and personal guarantees to shield the members of the constitutional courts from political pressure. Evaluating comparative appointment models, the paper highlights a key shif in moder autocratization: overt court-packing is increasingly replaced by procedural obstruction, where political actors deliberately leave judicial seats vacant to paralyze the court. Applying a certain methodological technique, the legitimacy algorithm to gridlock-breaking measures, the study concludes that any unilaterl reform bypassing cross-party consensus and independent expert consultation lacks institutional legitimacy, degrading intended constitutional repair into a form of court-packing.
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