The Question of the Recriminalisation of Overpricing Misdemeanors in Retrospective Historical Interpretation

Abstract

As a general rule, prices are determined by the relationship between supply and demand; however, in certain cases, the state must intervene in market pricing using tools from various branches of law. The most severe form of intervention is the criminalization of price-gouging behavior, which is not without precedent in Hungarian legal history—its first regulation occurred in the first half of the 20th century. Because of economic downturns, state-imposed price controls have reemerged in Hungary, consequently the issue of recriminalizing overpricing misdemeanors has also appeared in contemporary criminal law literature. The key question is whether such behaviors pose a level of social harm sufficient to justify their criminalization without violating the fundamental principles of criminal law. Answering this question is the the main objective of the study. In the course of my analysis, I relied on two methodological approaches: (1)I applied the doctrine of gradually increasing violation of legal matters, which can be derived from the ultima ratio principle; (2) on the other hand, I applied retrospective historical interpretation, so I examined whether price-gouging behaviors can be integrated into the doctrinal framework of criminal law in the current economic context, by considering their historical forms.