A RÉSZVÉTELI KÖLTSÉGVETÉS TÉRBELISÉGE BUDAPESTEN – LEHETŐSÉGEK ÉS KORLÁTOK II. RÉSZ

Absztrakt

Building on the theoretical and institutional framework presented in the first part of this article, this study provides an empirical spatial analysis of the participatory budgeting programme in Budapest (2020–2025). The research aims to explore how the socio-economic structure and political preferences of the capital shape citizen participation, and whether the programme mitigates or reproduces existing territorial inequalities. The methodology relies on GIS-based spatial analysis of 1,108 geolocated proposals (out of 2,595) and multivariate statistical tests (partial correlation, Mann-Whitney U test, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index). The findings reveal a marked center-periphery dichotomy: inner districts receive significantly more proposals relative to their population than outer areas, confirmed by a concentration index of 0.5. Statistical analyses highlight that participation shows a strong positive correlation with service density ($r=0.747$) and income levels ($r=0.628$). A novel finding is the impact of political preferences: data indicate higher engagement in districts with a strong opposition base, while areas supporting the pro-government or radical right parties show significantly lower participation. This suggests that the exercise of the “right to the city” is currently culturally and politically uneven. The study also identifies technical aspects of procedural injustice. Network analysis of physical voting locations (15-minute isochrone zones) shows that democratic infrastructure covers almost exclusively the inner districts, leaving peripheral areas as “deserts.” This results in the systemic exclusion of social groups affected by the digital divide. Similarly, the spatial distribution of implemented projects (for example, bicycle stands, drinking fountains) follows inner-city clusters, further exacerbating distributive disadvantages. The conclusion argues that, in its current form, participatory budgeting in Budapest exhibits the “Matthew effect”: resources and decision-making power concentrate in already active and advantaged central areas. To restore spatial justice, the paper proposes a specific policy intervention: the introduction of “spatial quotas” or idea zones (inner/outer zones). Such a mechanism would ensure a fairer allocation of resources, enforce the targeted inclusion of peripheral areas, and secure recognitive justice for local communities in urban development decision-making.

The study also identifies technical aspects of procedural injustice. Network analysis of physical voting locations (15-minute isochrone zones) shows that democratic infrastructure covers almost exclusively the inner districts, leaving peripheral areas as “deserts.” This results in the systemic exclusion of social groups affected by the digital divide. Similarly, the spatial distribution of implemented projects (e.g., bicycle stands, drinking fountains) follows inner-city clusters, further exacerbating distributive disadvantages.

The conclusion argues that, in its current form, participatory budgeting in Budapest exhibits the “Matthew effect”: resources and decision-making power concentrate in already active and advantaged central areas. To restore spatial justice, the paper proposes a specific policy intervention: the introduction of “spatial quotas” or idea zones (inner/outer zones). Such a mechanism would ensure a fairer allocation of resources, enforce the targeted inclusion of peripheral areas, and secure recognitive justice for local communities in urban development decision-making.