Israel’s recent war in Gaza

Part I. Military and political situation before the war, goals of belligerents

Abstract

The new round of the Israeli-Palestine series of conflicts and war, resulting again just a ceasefire, after 50 days of fighting, ended on 26 of August 2015. This war was triggered by Hamas kidnapping and murder in West Bank of three Israeli students followed by a huge rockets campaign targeting Israeli important populated areas, including the capital as well. Hamas has learned a lot from previous military defeats, has changed its tactics and in this case they applied a better form of asymmetric warfare, well fit to Gaza’s urbanized environment. By using tunnels for hidden maneuvers of terrorist groups, mines, booby traps, living shields, suicide bombers and snipers the terrorists have inflicted record casualties on Israeli troops waging an offensive in the Gaza Strip. IDF, taking advantage of its absolute air superiority, much better fire power, military skills and existing decisive superiority in the high-tech weaponry, launched the Operation Protective Edge in order to eliminate the threat of terrorist tunnels. The Palestinian rocket campaign on Israel has appeared largely marginal and ineffective, as the caused damages and casualties were almost zero. Even if the Hamas’ terrorist forces and its allied terrorist groups were better trained and equipped, they were unable to avoid being defeated by of Israeli elite forces. The first volume of the author’s current two-part work is dealing with the military and political situation preceding the war and the goals of belligerents. Meanwhile, the second one is focusing on the dynamics of war and the performance of fighting parties.