The problem of moral over-demandingness and the philosophy of vocation

Abstract

The main question of the paper is how one can simultaneously accept both that moral obligations impose categorical demands on individuals across all areas of life, regardless of their personal preferences, and that agents have the right to follow their own preferences in many aspects of life. My hypothesis is that this question can be addressed through the concept of vocation, as this integrates both the categorical nature of morality and the significant role of individual preferences in life choices. After outlining the problem of moral over-demandingness, I introduce the concept of vocation, explore its possible interpretations, and examine the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches. Since the concept of vocation first emerged within the Judeo-Christian tradition, my analysis begins with the theistic understanding of vocation. I then present the general characteristics of the concept before turning to secular theories. The conclusion of the paper is that only theistic theories have thus far been able to adequately address the problem of over-demandingness by providing a clear explanation of the source and relationship between morality and vocation. Secular theories, on the other hand, either remain unclear on this point or establish a relationship between the two that excessively diminishes the normative weight of either morality or vocation.