Modal intuitions and possible worlds

Abstract

In developing philosophical theories, almost all philosophers accept and use metaphilosophical principles and beliefs, not always explicitly stated, which relate to the nature and aims of philosophical theories. In this paper, I try to present certain elements of Lewis’s modal metaphysics as fitting well into the metaphilosophical vision he adopts. I am convinced that an important pillar of Lewisian realism about possible worlds is to be found in his philosophical methodology, in the theoretical conservatism which holds that we must respect our commonsense intuitions in philosophical theorizing. After a brief introduction to Lewis’s metaphilosophy, I consider two modal intuitions, one concerning the contingency of physics and the other concerning about the possibility of alien properties and alien worlds, and his attempts to preserve them in the metaphysics of modality. I show that these attempts have largely determined why Lewis developed the
metaphysical view that is most attacked precisely because it is counterintuitive.