Self, Narrative, Understanding

Additions to a Philosophical Theory of the Narrative Self

Abstract

In this article, I consider narratives to be both self-constitutive structures and interpretive frameworks that ensure the effectiveness of communication processes. Through the model developed for the foundation of this conception, I try to position this idea in the epistemological and psychological debates that determine the theory of the narrative self, and in the series of hypotheses that mark the different directions of the philosophy of narrativism. This study argues that these debates basically stem from a different perception of the relationship between the self and the narrative, and two clearly distinguishable positions (the concept of narratives constituting the fictitious self, the hypothesis of narratives shaping the embodied self) are outlined by the philosophy of consciousness, cognitive sciences and in the field of psychology. After reviewing the philosophical positions related to the theory of the narrative self, I will argue that the intersubjective and
self-constitutive function of narratives can be traced back to the coexistence and interaction of explicit and implicit narrative levels. In my study, I am also looking for an answer to the question of how the simultaneous operation of the assumed narrative levels can become a pillar of the everyday practice called folk psychology, through which the individuals attribute intentions, desires, and opinions to each other in a given situation
in the light of recognized behavioral patterns. In other words, I am trying to highlight how the use of interpretive schemes that also assume implicit narratives can enable us to endow others with beliefs, desires, hopes or fears during communicative actions, and in the light of this to understand the communicative intentions behind their transmitted messages, and classify the actions of others as rational and therefore predictable under certain conditions.