Which Free Will Exists?

Abstract

This paper investigates the concept of free will by engaging with László Bernáth’s Létezik-e szabad akarat? [Is there Free Will?]. It introduces a methodological approach to clarify the conditions under which a person can act otherwise, emphasizing the necessity to specify the descriptive levels of reality being discussed. The study critiques Bernáth’s arguments, demonstrating that they better align with the empirical free will thesis rather than his original intent. It explores the implications of empirical free will for moral responsibility, arguing that accepting empirical free will resolves Bernáth’s epistemological challenges. The paper also addresses classical incompatibilist objections, showing they do not undermine empirical free will. Additionally, it examines the relationship between different determinism concepts and the potential for an empirically justified notion of free will. The conclusion considers the future of human freedom, positing that knowledge expansion could broaden rather than constrain empirical free will, despite potential technological threats.