Why Is Philosophical Anthropology Timely?

Abstract

Philosophical inquiry into the human form of life finds itself caught in a pincer between unreflective anthropocentrism and its anti-humanistic overcorrections. My critical survey of the experiences and considerations that motivate the main variants of these antipodes aims to show that there is not only elbow room but also an urgent need for philosophical anthropology. Large areas of contemporary philosophical discussion are characterized by an unreflective anthropocentrism that attaches no importance to the fact that ours is one of countless forms of organic life. The marginalization of nature in late modernity and the preponderance of formalistic self-conceptions are to blame for this blind spot. Anti-humanistic overcorrections of unreflective anthropocentrism, in turn, deny that the human form of life is normatively significant, invariant, or unique in any fundamental, categorial sense. Similarly to the rise of humanism in early modernity, the contemporary proliferation of anti-humanistic positions responds to powerful historical experiences. I consider six variants of anti-humanism, which are due, respectively, to (1) scientism; (2) misanthropic reactions to our collective failures; (3) awareness of historical variation and cultural diversity; (4) posthumanistic and transhumanistic visions of scientific-technological progress; (5) ecological concerns; (6) and considerations of animal ethics. Although each of these positions has some basis in central characteristics of our life form and register radical challenges to our self-understanding, their proponents throw out the baby with the bathwater. Drawing on Helmuth Plessner’s writings and a variety of contemporary arguments, I claim that some of the most pressing question we face today call for a philosophical theory of the human life form in its natural embeddedness and plasticity.