Review of Sociology 34(2): 75–102

An Examination of Young People's Vulnerability in the Context of the Hungarian Youth Survey 2000-2020[1]

Ifjúsági sebezhetőség a Magyar Ifjúságkutatás 2000–2020 tükrében

Mariann Fekete[2]

https://doi.org/10.51624/SzocSzemle.12094
Manuscript received: 14 July 2023.
Modified manuscript received: 14 December 2023.
Acceptance of manuscript for publication: 29 January 2024.

Abstract: Youth is the age associated with vulnerability. The concept of vulnerability refers to defencelessness, lack of protection, exposure to the risks of structural and societal changes, and limited access to the resources needed to cope. In this paper, I analyse six waves of data collection (2000-2020) from the survey series "Magyar Ifjúság (Hungarian Youth)" that was conducted with eight thousand participants (15-29 years of age) for 20 years and attempt to identify the most vulnerable groups of youth in Hungary in certain priority areas where youth are present: in education and the labour market. When examining youth vulnerability, I pay particular attention to the risk of digital vulnerability: those young people who were excluded from the information society that was emerging during the examined period and who are not connected to the internet. I introduce the concept of a new type of extreme vulnerability. When performing a secondary analysis of longitudinal youth research data, I also test my hypothesis that groups of young people who are otherwise not or less impacted by traditional vulnerabilities may also be affected – youth with higher-level education, and those living in cities under orderly financial circumstances. The analysis of data shows that Roma youth constitute the particularly vulnerable group of youth in Hungary. Non-internet-enabled youth aged 15-29 are an extreme vulnerable group of people. However, youth with a higher education degree living in county capitals were also affected by the new type of vulnerability that is emerging due to global risks.

Keywords: youth, traditional vulnerability, extreme vulnerability, global risks

Összefoglaló: Az ifjúkor a sebezhetőség időszakaként számon tartott életszakasz. A sebezhetőség fogalma a fiatalok által az átmenet során megtapasztalható kiszolgáltatottságot, védtelenséget, a strukturális és társadalmi változások kockázatainak való kitettséget, a megküzdéshez szükséges erőforrásokhoz való korlátozott hozzáférést jelenti. Munkámban arra teszek kísérletet, hogy a nyolcezer fő (15–29 éves) meg-

1 The research was supported by the Digital Society Competence Centre of the Humanities and Social Sciences Cluster of the Centre of Excellence for Interdisciplinary Research, Development and Innovation of the University of Szeged. The author is a member of the Diffusion and globalization research group.

2 University of Szeged, email: fekete.marianna@szte.hu

kérdezésével 20 éve zajló Magyar Ifjúságkutatás-sorozat hat adatfelvételi hullámának (2000–2020) adatait elemezve azonosítsam a magyar ifjúsági társadalom legsérülékenyebb csoportjait az ifjúsági színtér kiemelt területein: az oktatás és a munkaerőpiac dimenziójában. Az ifjúsági sebezhetőség vizsgálata során kiemelt figyelmet fordítok a digitális sérülékenység kockázatára: a vizsgált időszakban kiépülő információs társadalomból kizáródó, nem internetképes fiatalok csoportjára. Bevezetem az új típusú, szélsőséges sebezhetőség fogalmát is. A longitudinális ifjúságkutatási adatok másodelemzése során tesztelem a hipotézisemet, mely szerint a sebezhetőség hagyományos típusai által nem, vagy kevésbé érintett ifjúsági csoportok is érintetté válnak: a magasan iskolázott, rendezett anyagi körülmények között, nagyvárosban élő fiatalok. A sebezhetőség hagyományos formái az alacsony státuszú, alacsonyan iskolázott szülői családból származó fiatalokat érintik döntően. Az adatelemzés eredményei azt mutatják, a magyar ifjúsági társadalom kiemelten sebezhető csoportját alkotják a roma fiatalok a vizsgált dimenziókban. A nem internetképes fiatalok az ifjúság szélsőségesen sebezhető csoportját testesítik meg. A globális kockázat révén jelentkező új típusú sebezhetőség által érintetté váltak a diplomás, megyeszékhelyen, megyei jogú városban élő fiatalok is.

Kulcsfogalmak: ifjúság, hagyományos sebezhetőség, szélsőséges sebezhetőség, globális kockázatok

Introduction, theoretical and conceptual framework

In this paper, I analyse six waves of data capture (2000-2020) from the survey series "Magyar Ifjúság" ("Hungarian Youth") that has been conducted with eight thousand participants (15-29 years of age) for the last 20 years. I attempt to look at youth vulnerability (Furlong-Stalder-Azzopardi 2000) and identify the most vulnerable groups of youth in Hungary in certain priority areas where youth are present.

Over the last three decades, the changing patterns of participation in education have had a powerful impact on youth lifestyles and societal chances in Hungary due to the prolonged labour market transitions and the extended reliance on parental families, thus augmenting the risks associated with youth (cf. Gábor 2002; Gazsó-Laki 2004; Gazsó 2006; Furlong-Cartmel 2007). Following the turn of the millennium, the transition of youth from school to work became increasingly complex and protracted; paths that were once linear and predictable became increasingly fragmented. This protracted transition may result in increased vulnerability, marginalisation and exclusion because it is complicated by breaks and changes of direction resulting from its non-linear nature (Furlong et al. 2006).

Fundamentally, youth is considered the age of vulnerability. Vulnerability is interpreted as the susceptibility and defencelessness experienced by young people during the different periods of their transition into adulthood. These risks are mainly experienced in terms of such factors as their choices and forced paths in the education system as well as their efforts to enter and stay in the labour market, but they are also manifested in their pursuit of an adult lifestyle, gaining financial independence, moving to a new household and building friendships or partnerships (Gábor 2003, Xie - Sen - Foster 2012). Besides the benefits and wide range of choices an autonomous age offers (Gábor 2009, Jancsák 2013), youth also encounter increasing uncertainties and risks, especially those distinct groups that are even more vulnerable than the average.

Vulnerability is defined as the restricted capacity of persons and social groups to confront structural and social change (Furlong-Stalder-Azzopardi 2000). In its extreme form, vulnerability means severely restricted opportunities for secure employment, social and economic advancement and personal fulfilment. The structural form of vulnerability should be distinguished from its other forms that arise from discrimination. Structural vulnerability is based on the lack of resources, poverty, and cultural responses to deprivation. Another aspect of vulnerability stems from gender, cultural, ethnic, and political discrimination affecting women of low social origin, members of ethnic minorities, migrants and, in certain cases, young people in general (Furlong-Stalder-Azzopardi 2000). Some of these discriminating factors are linked and thus intensify each other, resulting in an extreme risk of vulnerability. According to Kaplan (2002), vulnerability derives from risky situations. He defines two main components of the latter. The external component is exposure to shock, stress, and catastrophe, while the internal component is the lack of ability to cope and weak resilience. However, Gallopin (2006) points out that vulnerable groups may be more prepared for stressful situations than groups that have never met with any substantial stressors.

However, vulnerability is not equivalent to poverty or being disadvantaged. Poverty refers to a lack of resources that prevents the individual from achieving a certain living standard. As a general category, vulnerability does not mean a lack but defencelessness and exposure to risk (Chambers 1989). A non-poor social status does not automatically guarantee the individual's safety from vulnerabilities caused by a shock-like, rapid-onset radical change (Giddens-Sutton 2017). Such experiences were common during the turmoil that affected healthcare, social, economic, and political systems after the appearance of Covid-19. Therefore, risk and risk-induced vulnerability are not a factual status in the present, but an expected outcome, a probability related to the future, which we anticipate through a likelihood judgement with a temporal aspect extending to the future. The international literature typically looks at the groups of vulnerable youth in the context of high-risk behaviours (Turner 2008, Loeber et al. 2012) or focuses on the problems of youth who suffer from various mental disorders (Chan et al. 2017) or who grew up in public care (Thurman et al. 2008, Bijleveld - van der Geest - Hendriks 2012). It may also make sense to highlight how factors like the free choice of schools, increasingly unequal chances in society and schools, and the strong selectivity and low equitability of the school system produce vulnerable groups of youth.

Due to the accelerated socioeconomic transformation in the 1990s, Hungarian youth, by the turn of the millennium (when the first data capture of the large-sample youth research was implemented), were confronted with the same challenges in terms of education, labour and leisure as the young people of European Union Member States. The change of an era in youth affairs involving the expansion of public and higher education took place among a landscape of societal inequalities based on origin

and geographical location in Hungary, markedly intensifying the disadvantages driven by these factors (Gazsó 1997, Gábor 2002, Gazsó 2006). Additionally, the change led to an intensification in selection mechanisms[3], which caused disadvantages for certain social and ethnic groups or even blocked them from accessing certain education system services. The education system was less and less able to handle these accumulated social and geographical disadvantages; its social permeability is low, and parental family socioeconomic status demonstrates a strong correlation with access to educational services. As a result of selection mechanisms, one of the most selective school systems in Europe emerged in Hungary (Csapó et al. 2014, Radó 2018), shifting towards the South-East-European model, where the quality of results is continuously deteriorating, and disadvantaged learners are released from the system without any secondary qualification at an increasing rate. The results of OECD's PISA surveys (PISA 2015, 2018) confirm from one round to the next that familial background has an extremely strong impact on the school performance of Hungarian learners, and there is a massive gap between pupils with the highest and the lowest performance (Kertesi-Kézdi 2013). Considering educational mobility, Hungary is very disadvantaged compared to other OECD countries.

During the 20 years that were examined, individual risks to youth were also found to be higher, alongside the structural dangers that affect competition for further education, for example, where success is increasingly impacted by social and societal dispositions outside the realm of knowledge and individual abilities. Youth defined as vulnerable are left behind very early in this competition, thus potentially reducing their chances in the labour market. Vulnerability also means the young person has few opportunities to shape their educational career (Fekete 2021). From the educational perspective, high-level vulnerability is associated with youngsters who are disadvantaged, come from families with limited educational experience, live in the smaller settlements of underprivileged or economically deteriorating regions, and belong to ethnic minorities.

The labour market vulnerability of youth is determined by the economic development level, economic crises, the structure of the labour market and the characteristics of the state welfare system. Furthermore, youth labour market risks and vulnerabilities are closely linked to educational expansion and an extended period of youth. The school-to-work transition is increasingly long and complicated, and labour uncertainty and volatility are becoming a daily experience for significant youth groups, along with such factors as the increased vulnerability of young workers (the spread of labour seen as precarious, e.g. part-time work and fixed-term labour contracts), more difficult and less secure career start for young

3 Hungary's public education system, as constructed from 1985 to 1993, involves selective solutions in multiple areas. It retains the universal eight-year-long primary education but has created "structure-changing" secondary schools, thus offering two early exit points from the universal system. These institutions select children based on the development level of their skills, learning outcomes and family background (Ercse 2018, Lannert 1998). Free school selection, which granted nearly unlimited selection rights to schools, was adopted as early as 1985.

entry-level employees, and increased gender disparity in terms of opportunities. Highly disadvantaged youth have severely limited chances in the labour market. This group includes unskilled or semi-skilled youngsters; inhabitants of lagging or underprivileged, economically declining regions; youngsters growing up in social care; ex-convicts; the homeless, ethnic minorities and young people who leave the labour market and are struggling to find re-entry points (young single mothers; young people with severe health problems).

Regarding youth affairs, during the change of era, looser patterns of traditional life management, longer schooling, and delayed entry into employment extended the leisure-centric youth period (Gábor 2006). The growing appreciation of leisure and the increased role of the media and a consumer society entail new risks. Several dimensions of leisure can be identified as vulnerability risks. One is the commercialisation of leisure, as a result of which commercialised, experience- and participation-centric leisure (cultural and music festivals, entertainment industry events) drive youngsters to attain an independent consumer status at ever earlier ages, which leads to the manifestation of economic inequalities in leisure. Risky leisure activities and chasing excitement also become part of youngsters' "leisure vocabulary" (Furlong et al. 2003). The young may be prone to engage in high-risk behaviours that lead to committing crimes, accidents, physical injury, emotional trauma, and health problems. In this sense, youth vulnerability also refers to the possibility of bad outcomes, risks, or dangers (Arora et al. 2015).

Relevant chapters of the volume that present data from Magyar Ifjúság (Hungarian Youth) 2000, 2004, and 2008 have looked at and analysed computer and internet use, with a focus on the consumption of media and culture (Bauer-Tibori 2002, Bauer-Szabó 2005, Bauer-Szabó 2009). In this early stage of their penetration, it is common to look at the computer and internet as entertainment devices. However, they have become indispensable entities that permeate all aspects of human life with the progress of technology, iterative innovation, and increasing penetration.

In this context, we can say that, in the two decades under consideration, digital capital has become as important as knowledge capital and has played a key role in defining the societal chances of the young. By "digital capital", I mean capital defined in terms of the dimensions of access and use to the latter, i.e. access to technology, practical knowledge about usage, digital literacy, and the totality of social connections that can be established through online communication tools. In this interpretation, digital capital has the main characteristic of forms of capital, according to Bourdieu, i.e. convertibility (Bourdieu 2004). Digital capital represents knowledge, skills and characteristics that can be deployed in the offline world; it can be converted into cultural, social and economic capital and can be used to reduce the risk of vulnerability.

Throughout the two decades mentioned above, the gap between youth groups has widened due to the inequality regarding their access to technology and their user skills (Galán 2015, Fehérvári 2017). Exclusion from information society reduces the length

of young people's educational trajectories and decreases their labour market chances and opportunities to integrate into the leisure activities so popular with youth. This means that digital deprivation has become a priority risk regarding the life situation and social standing of the young, which claim applies and can be interpreted not only within the domain of leisure time but also in education and work. Non-internet-enabled, digitally vulnerable youngsters constitute a particularly vulnerable group in society. Due to constraints on space, I do not look further at the risks in the leisure dimension in this paper. Instead, I focus on digital capital.

Besides the increased appreciation for digital competencies, the construction of a world risk society (Beck 2008) led to yet another turn of events for youth in the analysed period: in addition to politico-economic decisions and structural aspects, their life careers and life chances are also increasingly shaped by global factors which, in my opinion, lead to new and ever more extreme vulnerabilities for the age group 15-29. They are confronted with new types of risks, which cannot (or not fully) be managed through individual strategies. As a result, young people feel disempowered and exposed; they struggle with increased uncertainty and unpredictability combined with an unplannable future, which are the primary sources of vulnerability. All of a sudden, this new type of extreme vulnerability causes an enormous disruption of young people's lives, generating unprecedented, drastic changes in a very short time. Consequently, with limited risk calculation, they have little to no opportunity to prepare for them. The Y2008 financial crisis and its impact on youth unemployment may be considered the "antecedent" of the new types of vulnerability. The young were impacted by the recession in the economies of the European Union in 2008-2009 harder than average. "The economic crisis and the subsequent difficulties in the labour market had severe consequences for the younger population. The proportion of the poor increased in this population, and the income inequalities between younger and older adults grew." (Medgyesi 2018: 184). In the spring of 2020, the COVID pandemic and the lockdowns also disproportionately impacted youth who experienced the pandemic at their performative and most vulnerable age (Déri-Szabó 2021).

Data sources and hypotheses

For the empirical analysis, I used databases of the youth survey series[4] conducted with 8,000 respondents polled for 20 years since 2000, which collected data with the same methodology, but different sets of questions adjusted to societal changes and technological innovation. "The 8000-person sample of the youth survey looking at the young in Hungary is nationally representative for the 15-29 age group – i.e. it ascertains that proportions within the population are reflected within the

4 Youth2000, Youth2004, Youth2008, Hungarian Youth 2012, Hungarian Youth Research 2016, Hungarian Youth Research 2020.

sample with regard to gender, age, schooling, settlement type, and region" (Székely 2021b). In line with the international literature, my data analysis investigates youth vulnerabilities in the typical main areas of education and the labour market in terms of the hypotheses below:

H1: Traditional, old-type vulnerabilities affect young people with disadvantaged, low-educated parental families living in economically lagging regions and small settlements, with particular regard to ethnic minorities.

H2: Due to the emergence of global risks, higher-status, educated youth groups that are hardly or not impacted by traditional vulnerabilities and live in larger towns under stable financial circumstances have also become affected by new types of extreme vulnerabilities.

The following statements regarding each analytical aspect increase the granularity of the latter hypotheses.

H2 (a): Youth who are traditionally vulnerable in terms of the educational aspect suffered further disadvantages during online education (in close correlation with their place in the system of digital inequalities), but the adverse effects of online education impacted traditionally non-vulnerable, higher-status youth (students in secondary and higher education) as well.

H2 (b): The new, pandemic-generated type of labour market vulnerability (sudden loss of jobs, unforeseeable downtimes, transition to home-office work) primarily impacted more educated young people living in cities and/or prosperous regions, whereas the labour market status and prospects of traditionally vulnerable youth were not affected significantly.

Results

Vulnerability in the dimension of education

Countless factors shape the social chances of the young generation. Schooling plays an essential role in attaining social status, so the education system's quality and social permeability are paramount. Comparative studies related to educational mobility have looked at the correlations between the levels of education of parents and their children. I use the level of schooling of the father as an explanatory variable in my analysis.

In Hungary, the expansion of secondary and higher education did not entail any improvement in the education system's social permeability (Figure 1). During the period analysed here, young people from families at the lower levels of the social hierarchy did not see any improvement in their relative chances of attaining higher education degrees. The data suggest that the education system was unable to provide assistance for vulnerable youth in the period 2000-2020. The educational trajectory of children of fathers with primary qualifications or below hardly ever lands them in the upper echelons of the education system.

Figure 1.: *Distribution of higher education students by fathers's highest qualification (%), N_{2020}=1078*



Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

According to Németh (2006), the father's occupation strongly impacts schooling, so it is reasonable to say that a part of social reproduction happens through achievement at school. Consequently, the school plays an important role in social reproduction; it can be seen as an important channel of such reproduction. One's education (school degree) plays a decisive role in labour market opportunities, attainable income, the risk of impoverishment, the quality of life, social capital, the amount of leisure time, and how leisure time may be spent.

Data from the youth research project confirm that the type of school that is accessible and the qualifications attainable by young people are determined by the father's qualification (Table 1). Between 2008[5] and 2020, one-third to four-tenths of children of fathers with primary school qualifications or below landed in vocational secondary education not associated with A-level qualifications, while less than one-tenth were enrolled in higher education.

5 See the relevant data of Youth in 2000 and 2004: Gazsó 2006: 216-220.

Table 1.: *Distribution of 15-29-year-old youth enrolled in school education by type of institution according to father's highest educational qualification 2008-2020, N_{2008}=3642, N_{2012}=3461, N_{2016}=3164, N_{2020}=3244.*

2012 -Father's qualification	Primary school	Vocational secondary school	Vocational grammar school, technical school	Grammar school	College BA	University MA	Higher Vocational training other course	total
Primary qualification or below	13%	39%	28%	9%	3%	3%	5%	100%
Frequency	47	140	102	34	11	12	18	364
Vocational secondary school	2%	15%	33%	17%	12%	6%	15%	100%
Frequency	30	185	396	202	144	76	187	1220
A-level	1%	4%	29%	22%	19%	10%	14%	100%
Frequency	15	34	225	167	146	77	104	768
Higher education qualification	2%	1%	11%	28%	22%	25%	9%	100%
Frequency	11	8	59	147	115	131	47	518
2016 -Father's qualification	**Primary school**	**Vocational secondary school**	**Vocational grammar school, technical school**	**Grammar school**	**College BA**	**University MA**	**Higher, Vocational training other course**	**total**
Primary qualification or below	7%	40%	19%	17%	3%	2%	12%	100%
Frequency	21	101	47	44	7	4	3	254
Vocational secondary school	1%	15%	23%	25%	10%	8%	18%	100%
Frequency	18	157	238	259	99	79	192	1042
A-level	1%	4%	18%	27%	18%	14%	18%	100%
Frequency	6	43	197	296	198	148	195	1083
Higher education qualification	2%	1%	6%	28%	24%	27%	12%	100%
Frequency	6	7	37	168	145	162	72	597
2020 - Father's qualification	**Primary school**	**Vocational secondary school**	**Vocational grammar school, technical school**	**Grammar school**	**College BA**	**University MA**	**Higher, Vocational training other course**	**total**
Primary qualification or below	1%	31%	25%	17%	5%	4%	17%	100%
Frequency	2	49	40	28	8	6	28	161
Vocational secondary school	0%	10%	21%	28%	19%	7%	15%	100%
Frequency	4	91	191	257	174	64	138	919
A-level	0%	1%	16%	34%	24%	10%	15%	100%
Frequency	2	8	141	299	211	88	132	881
Higher education qualification	0%	1%	7%	31%	31%	23%	7%	100%
Frequency	2	7	50	219	219	162	50	709

College: old education system; BA: new education system according to the Bologna Process since 2006; University: old education system; MA: new education system according to the Bologna Process since 2006. Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

The children of parents with higher qualifications have a much greater chance of being admitted to higher education. In contrast, the children of low-educated parents try to find their path in vocational training. The social environment is a decisive factor in further education decisions; the socio-cultural background determines the type of educational institution the child can access and limits the achievable social status. On the other hand, a paper by Ákos Huszár (2022) analysed the incomes of people in different class situations and found that inequalities between different occupational groups had declined by the late 2010s; both the top and the bottom fifths by income had become more heterogeneous. According to Huszár, the explanation lies in the relative deterioration of the income of certain executive and intellectual occupations and the significant improvement of that of certain working-class groups: skilled and semi-skilled labourers appeared in the top 20% of earners. Hungary saw the exact opposite process between 1980 and 2010, but the trend reversed by the end of the decade: the proportion of skilled labourers in the top 20% of earners significantly increased from 2015 to 2019, also with the outstanding growth of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, while intellectuals are represented with increasing weight in the bottom 20% of earners. Reflecting on these data, we may say that on seeing the changes in labour market status and income-earning potential, young people belonging to vulnerable groups make a rational decision by pursuing a vulnerability-reducing strategy when, after completing their primary studies or obtaining a vocational training certificate, they choose to work as semi-skilled labourers instead of continuing contingent or ab ovo hopeless further education. The losers associated with the changing earning potential are the young first-generation intellectuals who chose a teaching career, for example.

Within youth society, the Roma form a highly vulnerable group from any of the perspectives under analysis. Looking at their situation in education, we should point out that issues with the elementary education of Roma children first appeared in the 1960s, and the process started slowly and with a number of difficulties. The participation of Roma youth in elementary education often entailed segregated institutions, different curricula, and special needs classes. Roma's elementary education became more general when non-Roma youth entered the stage of massifying secondary education (Bocsi 2016). Following the political changes in 1989, the school segregation of Roma children increased significantly (Kertesi-Kézdi 2013). Kertesi-Kézdi argued that the most important roots of school segregation (segregation at the place of residence and the selectiveness of the school system) are, by themselves, insufficient explanations for the overwhelming presence and persistence of segregation. Complex societal and power dynamics are at play, which is also demonstrated by the fact that the free choice of schools, which sustains selection, and the reform of six- and eight-form secondary grammar schools have never received any real political support (Kende 2018). Segregation within schools serves the interests of the local majority; it sustains physical and social barriers, which align with social hierarchies constructed along ethnic and racial lines (Messing 2017).

Qualification indicators in youth surveys show a slight improvement for Roma youth between 2004[6] and 2020 (Figure 2), yet significantly different than for non-Roma youth in the 15-29 age group. The vast majority of the former end their educational trajectory in primary school[7]. Despite the expansion of public and higher education, certain levels of education remain closed, and the relative chances of Roma young people obtaining a degree have not changed. The proportion of young Roma people who completed their school career with a school-leaving certificate doubled by 2012 (2004:5%, 2012:10%), after which it dropped close to the 2004 level. The positive development of the period is the decrease in the proportion of those with a maximum of primary school education and the steady increase in the share of people with a vocational education, which can be interpreted as a factor that reduces the vulnerability of Roma youth in terms of the change in earning opportunities.

Table 2.: Highest qualifications of Roma and non-Roma young people who have completed their studies (%) $N_{non\ roma2004}$= 4119, $N_{non\ roma2008}$=3955, $N_{non\ roma2012}$ =3693, $N_{non\ roma2016}$ =4805, $N_{non\ roma2020}$ =4703, $N_{roma2004}$=227, N=$_{roma2008}$=331, $N_{roma2012}$=420, N_{roma}2016=268, $N_{roma2020}$=236

	Roma youth				Non-Roma youth			
	Primary qualification or below	Vocational qualification	A-level degree	College university degree	Primary qualification or below	Vocational qualification	A-level degree	College university degree
2004	78	17	5	0	15	35	35	15
2008	67	22	9	2	12	30	38	20
2012	65	23	10	2	14	30	42	14
2016	70	27	3	0	13	29	41	17
2020	65	28	6	1	8	26	47	19

Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

Vulnerable youth are more likely to fail at school (dropping out, repeating a year, poor performance), a phenomenon which especially applies to Roma youth. Typical reasons for dropping out of primary school without a qualification include learning problems ("was a bad student, dropped out"), reaching compulsory school-leaving age, and family and financial issues[8]. Very few Roma youth surpass their parents' education level.

Summing up the above, young people living in low-educated parental homes and most members of ethnic minority groups are considered highly vulnerable youth. They are highly likely to drop out, end their school trajectory without a leaving certificate, and become unemployed long-term.

6 From 2004, large-scale youth surveys had the opportunity to study the life strategies, education and labour market status and leisure habits of young people identifying as Roma/Gypsy.

7 Between 2004 and 2020, one-third of Roma youth went on to study in secondary education (2008:34%, 2012:39%, 2016:33%, 2020:38%), typically in vocational training institutions that did not award A-level qualifications. Around one-fifth of these young people dropped out before obtaining their certificate (2008:14%, 2012:19%, 2016 and 2020:17%)

8 Bad results at school, dropped out: 2008:25%, 2012:28%, 2016:22%, 2020:26%. 4. Was unable to finish by the compulsory school-leaving age: 2008:21%, 2012:10%, 2016:33%, 2020:14%. Dropped out due to family reasons (marriage, childbirth): 2008:16%, 2012:25%, 2016:9%, 2020:9%. Dropped out for financial reasons (went to work instead): 2008:7%, 2012:6%, 2016:13%, 2020:12%.

Vulnerability in the labour market

The labour market vulnerabilities identified at the turn of the millennium did not disappear in the past decade either, but they had a smaller impact on members of the 15-29 age group. Unemployment appears with less and less weight on the problem map of young people in the analysed period. While nearly half (48%) of young people reported unemployment as the most significant problem for youth in 2000, the rate was only 5% in 2020. In parallel, uncertainty and an unpredictable future were identified as the most severe threat by an increased share of respondents (24%) (Tóth-Fekete-Nagy 2022).

In Hungary, compared to other European countries, the background of origin plays a more significant role in school progress and, through this, in labour market careers and adult financial status (Harcsa et al. 2022). The family background and the parental family's social, cultural, and economic situation strongly affect young people's educational trajectory and school performance, thus affecting their labour market outcomes. Young people who inherit fewer resources are more likely to enter the labour market with a weaker education and lower-level skills, and their labour market opportunities are reduced by the lack of connections required for success (Medgyesi 2018). Being educated also entails a particular lifestyle and cultural background, and cognitive skills are not necessarily considered the most important assets in some segments of the labour market. Instead, social and societal dispositions inherited within the family and unavailable from school play a role (Németh 2006).

The youth research data also confirm the close correlation between origin, school trajectory and employment chances. The father's qualifications strongly determine young people's chances in the labour market through such factors as the education system, degrees obtained and/or lack of skills. Around half of children whose fathers had a maximum of a complete or incomplete primary school education are unable to break out of the low-education trap; their labour market prospects make them likely to become unemployed (Table 3). Between 2008 and 2020, young people whose fathers had a complete or incomplete primary education were highly overrepresented in the inactive group[9], especially in the Y2008 and Y2012 polls, where the results reflected the impact of the global financial crisis (39% and 44%). The period from 2008 to 2014 was characterised overall by a growing rate of unemployment among the young in almost all EU Member States (Medgyesi 2018).

9 Young people who receive some form of benefit (maternity benefit, childcare allowance, other benefit, etc.), are dependent, or do not participate in education or training.

Table 3.: Economic activity of 15-29 youth by the fathers' highest educational qualification (%) $N_{2008}{}^{10}{}_{-2020}$=8000

	Father's qualification	Primary qualification or below	Vocational qualification	A-level degree	College/ university degree
2008	student	25%	37%	45%	53%
	active	34%	42%	37%	31%
	inactive	39%	16%	9%	5%
2012	student	28%	38%	46%	62%
	active	27%	44%	44%	31%
	inactive	44%	18%	9%	6%
2016	student	19%	32%	46%	56%
	active	48%	57%	48%	40%
	inactive	33%	11%	6%	4%
2020	student	20%	32%	42%	57%
	active	51%	58%	52%	37%
	inactive	29%	6%	6%	5%

Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

The labour market data support the use of the term "vulnerability" over such terms as "disadvantaged situation" or "poverty". From the early 1960s onwards, the vast majority of young people with a complete primary education were directed toward vocational training programmes; professional training was trade-oriented and closely linked to socialist industry. The decade following the change in the political system saw vocational education become weaker, detached from the economy, underfinanced and disoriented. Trained for professions with no labour market relevance and lacking any practical work experience, huge groups of young people became unemployed en masse (Laki 2006). The affected youth were unable to anticipate and prepare for the radical structural changes brought on by the change in the political system, nor were they successful in developing coping strategies. Dropping out of school and having low qualifications was associated with a significant risk of weak labour market integration until the mid-2010s. At the turn of the millennium, one-fifth of people with a complete primary education were inactive (21%). In contrast, nearly one-quarter of people with vocational trade school certificates were inactive (24%). Similarly, the survey conducted four years later showed that primary school dropouts and vocational trade school graduates were the most at-risk groups in terms of unemployment. Looking at the socio-demographic characteristics of unemployed youth polled in the years affected by a global risk factor, the global financial crisis (2008, 2012), we can establish that rural, low-educated young people were the most vulnerable: over one-third of young people with primary qualification or below and/or vocational trade certificates and over four-tenths of young people living in rural villages, respectively, had experienced unemployment (Table 4). Regional and residential disadvantages were relevant throughout the 20 years of analysis; unemployment and inactivity rates were the highest among young people living in small villages in North Hungary, South Transdanubia, and the Northern Great Plains.

10 See the 2000-2004 data in Gazsó 2006 (p. 216).

Table 4.: *Distribution of unemployed youth by socio-demographic socio-demographic characteristics, N_{2008}=544, N_{2012}=771*

Socio-demographic characteristics	2008	2012
man	59%	56%
woman	41%	44%
Primary qualification or below	35%	39%
Vocational secondary school	29%	33%
A-level	28%	27%
Higher education qualification	9%	6%
15-19 yrs.	14%	11%
20-24 yrs.	44%	48%
25-29 yrs.	43%	41%
Budapest	9%	9%
City with county seat rights	13%	14%
Town/city	35%	27%
Village	43%	41%

Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

The mid-2010s brought several important but controversial changes in terms of the labour market for young people. The drop in the unemployment rate and related employment growth meant a favourable turn of events for them. Employment in the public service programme made a higher-than-average contribution to the growing employment rate among young people (Bene-Krémer-Pintye 2018). In 2016 and 2020, the rate of inactives due to unemployment was 3% among jobless young people.

Although the employment indicators of highly vulnerable Roma youth improved significantly from 2012 to 2020, the latter were still overrepresented among the inactive and the unemployed throughout the analysed period compared to non-Roma youth; the worst unemployment figures were registered in 2008 and 2012 (Table 5).

Table 5.: Table: Distribution of Roma and non-Roma youth by their main activity (%), $N_{roma2000}$=324, $N_{Ifjúság2004}$=7676, $N_{roma2004}$=442, $N_{Ifjúság2008}$=7558, $N_{roma2008}$=623, $N_{Ifjúság2012}$=7377, $N_{roma2012}$=328, $N_{Ifjúság2016}$=7672, $N_{roma2016}$=293, $N_{Ifjúság\ 2020}$=7682, $N_{roma2020}$=293

	Non-Roma youth				Roma youth			
	Active	Inactive	Student	Unemployed	Active	Inactive	Student	Unemployed
2004	39	10	38	7	24	35	22	18
2008	39	9	45	7	23	17	26	21
2012	38	10	42	9	19	24	29	26
2016	49	9	40	2	37	32	18	12
2020	50	7	40	3	44	27	19	10

Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

For individuals belonging to the highly vulnerable youth group, social mobility and progressing out of a hopeless situation pose a severe challenge; a lack of mobilisable resources even makes this an impossible mission. This group comprises young people

whose short school careers did not allow them to attain a knowledge base that can be used in the labour market; as a result, they are unable to enter or stay in the labour market.

Digital vulnerability

Despite the constantly improving ICT usage indicators[11] of 15–29-year-old people from 2004 to 2012[12], one particular group of youth was nonetheless unable to break out of digital isolation. Those left out can be characterised based on the classic factors of inequality: digital deprivation is most strongly determined by school qualifications[13], economic activity[14], the young person's age[15] and type of settlement[16]. Unemployed, inactive, low-educated youth in the older age groups who have already left the school system and live in a rural environment are often left out of information society and thus become highly vulnerable (Table 6).

Table 6.: *Distribution of 15–29-year-old youth who never use a computer or the internet according to economic activity (%)* $N_{2004\text{-}2012}$*=8000*

	2004		2008		2012	
	computer use	internet use	computer use	internet usage Frequency (never)	computer-home	Internet-home
Primary qualification or below	32	15	23	23	15	26
Skilled worker	59	37	33	32	33	32
A-level	17	12	7	7	7	7
Higher ed diploma	6	6	2	2	2	2
Economically active	39	24	16	15	16	15
Inactive	70	36	45	46	45	46
Student	7	8	6	5	6	5
Unemployed	60	26	43	39	43	39
15-19 yrs.	14	11	10	2	12	29
20-24 yrs.	31	14	15	15	14	34
25-29 yrs.	41	22	23	22	18	38
Budapest	19	9	14	14	9	14
County seat	22	11	6	5	11	12
Town/city	30	15	18	17	35	35
Village	39	22	29	24	45	39

Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

In 2016 and 2020[17], 5% and 1.4% of members of the 15-29 age group had been left behind, respectively, mainly due to financial deprivation and other disadvantages.

11 See detailed data for Y2016 in: Tóth 2018:293, Y2020 data: Koltói-Varga 2022: 295-303.

12 In 2004, 30% of members of the 15-29 age group did not use a computer, and 15% never used the internet; in 2008 16% had never used a computer or the internet; in 2012 the proportion was 15% of young people.

13 The correlation is significant p<0,001.

14 The correlation is significant p<0,001.

15 The correlation is significant p<0,001.

16 The correlation is significant p<0,001.

17 See detailed Y2016 data in: Tóth 2018:293, Y2020 data: Koltói-Varga 2022: 295-303.

The digitally isolated group typically consists of inactive people with primary qualifications or below living in small villages in North Hungary and the Northern Great Plains. This group demonstrates a significant overlap with the group of Roma youth, the vast majority of whom are the least characterised by ICT usage and often lived in digital isolation throughout the 20 years under analysis (Figure 5). According to the last survey, over half of all Roma youth did not use a computer, and nearly one out of ten had never used the internet.

Figure 2.: *Share of Roma youth not using a computer or the internet (%) N_{2004}=324, N_{2008}=442, N_{2012}=623, N_{2016}=328, N_{2020}=293*



Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

In relation to this area of study, it is important to note that when the data were collected, i.e., in the fall semester of 2020, when school education was primarily conducted online, nearly four-tenths (37%) of Roma students' households had no computer/laptop, 17% had no internet subscription, a quarter had no Wi-Fi access, one-tenth of the affected Roma youth had no smartphone and over one-third had no internet subscription on their smartphone. These youngsters were unable to get involved in online education; they amassed a backlog of several months of learning through no fault of their own, their social network weakened even further during this period, and they were increasingly removed from institutional education.

The digitally deprived are a group that is isolated from the mainstream of Hungary's youth society and stuck on the periphery. The affected youth lack the increasingly important knowledge assets and information they could obtain on their own through internet use and the relationship capital they could convert into the

offline world. Recapitulating what I said in the introduction, non-internet-enabled youth constitute a highly vulnerable group in the 15-29 age bracket.

New types of vulnerability

As I stated in the introduction, the new life situation associated with the framework of radical uncertainty leads to new and increasingly extreme types of vulnerability for youth. However, the old vulnerabilities also continue to exist.

Although the COVID pandemic impacted the labour market for a relatively short time (i.e., 6-12 months), its effects were even stronger than those of the 2008 crisis (Köllő 2022). Groups such as young entrants to the labour market and young people employed abroad or in the service and hospitality industry (the share of youth is large in this category) were impacted by the crisis more intensely and for a longer time; the employment disadvantage of new labour market entrants doubled in 2020. People with primary or vocational qualifications did/could not use the home office as an option for work, along with only a very small minority of those with A-level qualifications: one out of ten affected people worked from home during the first wave of the pandemic. Zoom meetings only became part of life for one-third and one-half of college and university graduates, respectively. More people with higher labour market status registered for public employment services compared to earlier years. The pandemic's unique structural impact was reflected in the unusual regional and occupational distribution of unemployed people: the rate of job seekers increased most in the commercial, hospitality, client management and personal services sectors. In contrast, the growth in unemployment was not significant in regions where the unemployment rate was already high, but it strongly affected people living in the capital and near the Austrian border (Boza-Krekó 2022).

International research on the subject has also found that young people were particularly vulnerable to the economic effects of the pandemic, as they have an inherently higher risk of unemployment and higher unemployment rates than older age groups. The amount of family transfers available to young people played a central role in coping with the pandemic. For those living in relatively stable financial circumstances, the pandemic was more of a relational challenge than a financial one (Cook et al. 2021). The COVID pandemic has hit young people who were already disadvantaged by the system of social inequalities particularly hard. Those working in the hospitality industry were the most vulnerable among the young people who were affected. Based on the former's findings, the authors argue that COVID was not simply a health pandemic affecting those in precarious, vulnerable jobs but a crisis of precarious work itself, in which young people are over-represented (Bengtsson et al. 2021). Finnish researchers (Vehkalahti - Armila - Sivenius 2021) have found that young people's reflexive lifestyles have been weakened as the global crisis has penetrated their mental, material and everyday lives, while many important social

structures have been weakened. Young people could not escape the consequences of a risk society (Beck 2008).

In terms of education, the Covid pandemic affected three academic years (until the end of 2021/2022). Traditionally, vulnerable youth groups were at high risk; they were the ones who were the most likely to drop out of online education, and earliest. "Entire school categories (vocational), entire regions, entire social groups are left out of the online version of public education" (Ugrai 2020: 122). By the time of the last phase of digital education, the rates did improve to a certain extent, but as many as 4%, 8% and 9% of grammar school, upper primary school and vocational school students, respectively, were still completely left out of education and the months spent in online education resulted in significant learning backlog and a lack of achievement of students with disadvantaged, low-educated parental families. The children of higher-status and more educated parents were more successful at coping with the difficulties of online education, but the lockdown of universities, online exams, A-levels and entrance exams strongly affected young people who are not traditionally considered vulnerable.

International research has examined the impact of online education on university students. At the University of Lucerne, many students reported concentration problems during digital instruction (Schwegler 2021). Online education has magnified the importance of the availability of infrastructure, various ICT tools and other factors, such as a properly functioning laptop, a stable internet connection and strong bandwidth. Jordanian researchers came to similar conclusions in their research on university students (Almahasees - Mohsen - Amin 2021), with a significant proportion of the latter reporting that they found it challenging to adapt to online learning (due to technical gaps, IT competencies and lack of fast internet access). In radically changed living conditions, many young people were challenged by the increase in leisure time and lack of peer interaction. The transition to higher education is difficult for young people, as they are not used to the typical higher education environment, with less structured weekly classes, less direct contact with teachers, and the expectation of independent learning. First-year students who have not yet fully adapted to the university environment found the digital transition even more challenging (Millare et al. 2021). Researchers have looked at their online learning strategies, and the results show that a third of them chose to participate less in online classes and did not interact with peers and teachers. This strategy significantly increased the odds of failing exams: every 'passive' week increased the chance of failing the exam by more than one and a half times (1.67).

To test the hypothesis about this new type of vulnerability, I use the data collected in the autumn of 2020 during the second wave of the pandemic. The two survey questions[18] present a limited opportunity to learn about young people's attitudes to

18 "And finally, let me ask you, in relation to the coronavirus pandemic, did the following things change in your life? As a result of the coronavirus pandemic, was there a change in...? your work (e.g., you lost your job, got a new job, new work schedule,

the pandemic as well as the direct and indirect impacts of COVID-19 on their lives. According to Levente Székely (2021a), the lives of less than half (44%) of the 15-29 age group were affected by the Covid pandemic. The difference between those who experienced such effects and those who did not can be best analysed in line with the factors of qualification, economic activity and regional characteristics. Those who experienced being impacted mentioned the increase in time spent online (23%) and the deterioration of their financial circumstances (19%).

In terms of youth who experienced the effects of the pandemic, school qualifications account for a significant difference ($p<0.001$) in their evaluations of their financial and labour market status (Figure 3). The strongest economic impact of the pandemic was experienced by the youth group with primary qualifications or below and those with higher education degrees; one out of every five affected young persons reported being affected strongly. Regarding their financial status, youth with primary qualifications or below were affected negatively (one out of every three). Higher level qualifications were negatively correlated with young people's perceptions of a deterioration in their financial situation and an increase in the experience of changes in work (e.g. new ways of working).

Figure 3.: *Young people no longer in education who experienced the impact of the pandemic on their financial status and work work, by school qualifications (%)* N_{work}*=939,* $N_{financial\ status}$*=1477, data source: Magyar Ifjúságkutatás 2020, figure: by author*



Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

etc.), your relationship, your residence (permanent or temporary), financial circumstances, relations with your family, plans for (further) education, plans to establish a family, workout or nutrition habits, time spent online, your connection to God, religion, spirituality, your involvement in the community (e.g., volunteering, helping others), the time your family spent discussing public and social issues."

"In your opinion, did [the latter issues] change for the better or for the worse as a consequence of the Covid pandemic..."?

Unfortunately, the two survey questions are insufficient for investigating the Covid pandemic's impact on education. The sub-question on the changes in time spent online does not directly correspond to the effects of digital education because leisure activity also predominantly shifted to the online space, and one specific group of young people worked online as well (home office). However, they still allow us to draw conclusions. One-third of the polled students reported that the Covid pandemic impacted the time they spent online, which they had a mixed opinion about: half of them said the change was positive, and half considered it harmful. Less than one-fifth (18%) of non-students (workers and inactive people[19]) experienced an increase in their online time, and they had a mixed reaction to it as well: half of them reported that the change was positive, and half believed it to be negative.

I used a logistic regression model[20] to explain the perceptions of the pandemic's impact on the different areas of life. The model includes the following explanatory variables: the respondent's age group, gender, highest school qualification, type of settlement and region. The model investigates whether these variables determine the pandemic's perceived impact or if other factors may have affected the experience. In terms of the labour market (Table 7), all of the model's explanatory variables had a significant impact: higher education graduates, members of the two older age groups, people living in cities with county seat rights and county seats, and those living in the Northern Great Plains and North Hungary were most likely to have experienced the Covid pandemic's impact on the labour market after March 2020. Compared to the youngest age group, members of the two older age groups were three times more likely to have felt the pandemic's impact on their work, explained simply by the factor of age: one-tenth of 15–19-year-olds were in employment[21] at the time of the survey. This likelihood was double (2.022) and 1.5 times greater (1.511) among higher education graduates and county seat inhabitants, respectively. The region variable exerted the most substantial effect; young people living in the Northern Great Plains and the Southern Great Plains were four (4.032) and over three (3.233) times more likely to be affected, respectively, while the likelihood was double in Central Hungary and Central Transdanubia. Women experienced significantly less Covid-related impact on their work than men (0.733).

19 N=4938

20 The explanatory power of this model is not too strong, although is acceptable (Nagelkerke R2=0.289)

21 Four tenths had a vocational qualification, a third had a secondary school leaving certificate, and a third had only a primary school certificate. These qualifications did not make a change in the type of work or a move to home office more likely but could make job loss more probable.

Table 7.: *Factors explaining the perception of pandemic impacts (Exp(B) values of logistic regression models, N = 7956, p ≤ 0.05, sig. = 0.000: ***, sig. Between 0.001 and 0.01 = **, sig. Between 0.01 and 0.05 = **, sig.*

Latent variable	Categories	Work Exp (B)	Financial situation Exp (B)	Time spent online Exp (B)
Age group	15-19 yrs.	Reference category	Reference category	Reference category
	20-24 yrs.	2.907***	2.222***	0.628***
	25-29 yrs.	2.950***	2.603***	0.440***
Respondent's gender	Man	Reference category	Reference category	Reference category
	Woman	0.733***	0.966	0.998
Highest qualification	Up to 8 years of school ed.	Reference category	Reference category	Reference category
	Skilled worker	1.09	1.006	0.698***
	A-level	1.283	0.746**	1.175
	diploma, PhD	2.022***	0.607***	2.064***
Type of settlement	Village	Reference category	Reference category	Reference category
	Town/city	0.973	0.400***	0.628***
	City with county seat rights, the county seat	1.511***	1.251***	1.909***
	Capital city	0.713*	0.751***	0.883
Region	Southern Great Plains	3.233***	1.313*	1.454***
	South Transdanubia	1.428	0.415***	0.499***
	Northern Great Plains	4.032***	1.519***	1.096
	North Hungary	2.330**	1.205	0.593***
	Central Transdanubia	2.346***	1.067	0.776*
	Central Hungary	2.450***	1.809***	1.369**
	Western Transdanubia	Reference category	Reference category	Reference category

Source: Hungarian Youth, own calculation

A changing financial situation was mostly strongly perceived by those belonging to the oldest age group (2,603). However, the perception of the latter decreases with the level of education: higher education graduates were the least likely to perceive that their financial circumstances had been affected by the pandemic (0.607). Young people living in cities with county seat rights, county seats (1.251) and Central Hungary (1.809) were significantly more likely to have experienced changes in their financial circumstances. Regarding the effect of settlement type and region, young people living in county seats and/or the Southern Great Plains and Central Hungary were more likely to report a change in their financial situation.

As for the pandemic's impact on time spent online, members of the two older age groups were less likely to experience this effect than those in the youngest (15-19) age group, in strong correlation with their student status and online education[22]. With regard to the significant impact of academic qualifications, higher education graduates were twice as likely to have experienced a change in the amount of time they

22 Eighty-five percent of the 15-19 age group were students at the time of the survey.

spent online in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. These data demonstrate the impact of switching to home-office-based work, which was an option primarily for young people with higher qualifications. Looking at the effects of settlement type and region, young people living in county seats (1,909), the Southern Great Plains (1,454) and Central Hungary (1,809) were most likely to report a change in the amount of time they spent online.

Summary

Using the data collected through large-scale youth surveys from 2000 to 2020, this paper identifies the most vulnerable groups of Hungarian youth society in the priority areas associated with youth – education and the labour market. It examines traditional and new forms of youth vulnerability. In the social scientific discourse, vulnerability is often associated with poverty and inequality. In line with Furlong, Stalder and Azzopardi (2018), I have argued that vulnerability means uncertainty and exposure to risk, i.e., the limited capacity of individuals and/or a social group to cope with structural and societal changes. Therefore, it is not identical to the deterministic notion of poverty or disadvantage; it is not a present state but a likelihood pertaining to the future. I interpreted the notion of vulnerability within the framework of the world risk society (Beck 2008). I hypothesised that, with uncertainty and unpredictability having become global factors, their consequences are already affecting existing practices, behavioural patterns and normality in the cultural sense. The unique characteristics of new types of vulnerability are that they are not driven only by structural and societal changes but by global events as well, thus rendering vulnerable certain youth groups that are not or only slightly affected by traditional vulnerabilities. Young people with uneducated or low-educated, low-status parental families are no longer the only ones exposed to risk; members of groups that are better equipped with the different types of capital are also affected. However, the ability to cope makes a significant difference since these young people can develop specific action strategies, unlike those youth groups who have no mobilisable resources.

The hypotheses were partially validated by the empirical research findings. The data analysis revealed that traditional vulnerability, which is driven by macro-economic processes and political decisions, affects, in all the analysed areas, young people who have been unable to break out of the low-education trap for generations, who live in economically declining regions, and mainly belong to the ethnic minority (H1). Disadvantages of origin and region, amplified by educational expansion, have further deepened (Gábor 2002, Gazsó 1997, Gazsó 2006). The lack of digital capital drastically exacerbates their vulnerability. During the Covid pandemic, digital vulnerability resulted in extreme vulnerability, especially for Roma youth in school: in the fall semester of 2020, when school education was primarily conducted online, nearly four-tenths (37%) of Roma students' households had no computer/laptop,

17% had no internet subscription, and a quarter had no Wi-Fi access. The data from the youth surveys also suggest a strong correlation between family background, origin and academic inequality; parents' education level determines children's attainable qualifications. In 2020, higher education, especially university education, was characterised by the involvement of children of fathers with higher education degrees. This group was extraordinarily affected by the new type of vulnerability, i.e., COVID-induced global risk, which changed their daily practices in a rapid and unforeseeable manner. Due to the lack of a question on online education, I was not able to test hypothesis H2a directly. Therefore, I consider it only partially confirmed.

When testing my hypotheses regarding the new type of vulnerability, the findings of the regression model suggested that the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on work was felt most intensely by 20–29-year-old higher education graduates who live in cities with county seat rights or county seats (H2b). The labour market statistics also supported my hypothesis that the COVID-induced labour market crisis had the strongest effect on youth employment, and the population with better labour market status was typically involved in registering for public employment services (Boza-Krekó 2022). Besides 15–19-year-old students, higher education graduates were predominantly affected by the changing amount of time spent online, demonstrating the effect of the transition to home-office-based work, which was an option primarily for young people with higher qualifications.

In the second decade of the second millennium, world risk society trends were radically exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the aftermath of which ended in yet another global risk caused by the extended Russia-Ukraine war and the resulting energy and economic crisis. In an age of global risks and crises, youth autonomy (Gábor 2009) is being curbed and shaken by unpredictability.

Bibliography

Almahasees, Z. – Mohsen, K. – Amin, M. O. (2021): Faculty's and Students' Perceptions of Online Learning During COVID-19. *Frontiers in Education*, 6(638470): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.3389/feduc.2021.638470

Arora, S. K. – Shah, D. – Chaturvedi, S. – Gupta, P. (2015): Defining and Measuring Vulnerability in Young People. *Indian Journal of Community Medicine*, 40(3): 193–197. https://doi.org/10.4103/0970-0218.158868

Bauer, B. – Tibori, T. (2002): Az ifjúság viszonya a kultúrához. In Bauer B. – Szabó A. – Laki L. (szerk.): *Ifjúság 2000. Tanulmánykötet I*. Budapest: Nemzeti Ifjúságkutató Intézet, 173-195.

Bauer, B. – Szabó, A. (szerk.) (2005): *Ifjúság 2004. Gyorsjelentés*. Budapest: Mobilitás Ifjúságkutatási Iroda.

Bauer, B. – Szabó, A. (szerk.) (2009): *Ifjúság 2008. Gyorsjelentés*. Budapest: Szociálpolitikai és Munkaügyi Intézet.

Beck, U. (2008): *Világkockázat-társadalom. Az elveszett biztonság nyomában*. Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale.

Bene, V. – Krémer, B. – Pintye, Zs. (2018): A 15-29 éves korosztály foglalkoztatásáról és munkaerőpiaci perspektíváiról – a Magyar Ifjúság Kutatás 2016 adatainak tükrében. In Nagy Á. (szerk.): *Margón kívül. Magyar Ifjúságkutatás 2016*. Budapest: Excenter Kutatóközpont, 98-153.

Bengtsson, T. T. – Blackman, S. – King, H. – Østergaard, J. (2021): Introduction to Special Issue. Distancing, Disease and Distress: The Young and COVID-19: Exploring Young People's Experience of Inequalities and Their Resourcefulness During the Pandemic. *Young*, (29) 4, 325-330. https://doi.org/10.1177/11033088211032827

Bijleveld, C. C. J. H – Geest, V. – Jan Hendriks, J. (2012): Vulnerable Youth in Pathways to Adulthood. In Loeber, R (szerk.): *Persisters and Desisters in Crime from Adolescence into Adulthood. Explanation, Prevention and Punishment*. London,: Routledge, 104-125. https://doi.org/10.1002/ace.20102

Bocsi, V. (2022): *Értelmiségképzés és felsőoktatás*. Szeged, Belvedere.

Bocsi, V. (2016): Expanzió és szelektivitás – oktatási helyzetkép a rendszerváltás után. In Nagy Á. – Székely L. (szerk.): *Negyedszázad. Magyar Ifjúság 2012*. Iuvenis Ifjúságszakmai Műhely – ISZT Alapítvány – Excenter Kutatóközpont – Új Ifjúsági Szemle Alapítvány, 147-178.

Bourdieu, P. (2004): Gazdasági tőke, kulturális tőke, társadalmi tőke. In Angelusz R. (szerk.): *A társadalmi rétegződés komponensei*. Budapest: Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 122-137.

Boza, I. – Krekó, J. (2022): Regisztrált munkanélküliség a járvány alatt, In Fazekas K. – Kónya I. – Krekó J. (szerk.): *Munkaerőpiaci Tükör 2021*. Budapest: MTA, Közgazdasági és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, 102-110.

Chambers, R. (1989): Editorial introduction: Vulnerability, coping and policy. *IDS Bulletin*, 20(2), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.1989.mp20002001.x

Chan, W. Y. – Kuperminc, G. P. – Seitz, S. – Wilson, C. – Khatib, N. (2019): School-Based Group Mentoring and Academic Outcomes in Vulnerable High-School Students. *Youth&Society* 52(7): 1220-1237. https://doi.org/10.1177/0044118X19864834

Cook, J. – Threadgold, S. – Farrugia, D. – Coffey, J. (2021): Youth, Precarious Work and the Pandemic. *Young* 29(4): 331- 348. https://doi.org/10.1177/11033088211018964

Csapó, B. – Fejes, J. B. – Kinyó, L. – Tóth, E. (2014): Az iskolai teljesítmények alakulása Magyarországon nemzetközi összehasonlításban. In Kolosi T. – Tóth I. Gy. (szerk.): *Társadalmi Riport 2014*. Budapest: TÁRKI, 110-135.

Déri, A. – Szabó, A. (2021): Generációs kihívás a poszt-Covid időszakban. In *Szociológiai Szemle*. 31(4): 4-27. https://doi.org/10.51624/SZOCSZEMLE.2021.4.1

Ercse, K. (2018): Az állam által ösztönzött, egyházasszisztált szegregáció mechanizmusa. In Fejes B. – Szűcs N. (szerk.): *Én vétkem. Helyzetkép az oktatási szegregációról*. Szeged: Motiváció Oktatási Egyesület, 177-200.

Fehérvári, A. (2017): Digitális egyenlőtlenségek Magyarországon. *Educatio,* 26(2): 157-168. https://doi.org/10.1556/2063.26.2017.2

Fekete, M. (2021): Megkoronázott sebezhetőségek – avagy a fiatalság új típusú megélése. *Iskolakultúra*, 31(2): 54-75. https://doi.org/10.14232/ISKKULT.2021.02.54

Furlong, A. – Stalder, B. – Azzopardi, A. (2000): *Vulnerable Youth: Perspectives on vulnerability in education, employment and leisure in Europe. European Youth Trends 2000*. France: Council of Europe.

Furlong, A. – Stalder, B. – Azzopardi, A. (2003): *Sebezhető ifjúság. Sebezhetőség az oktatásban, a munkavállásban és a szabadidőben Európában*. Szeged, Belvedere Kiadó.

Furlong, A. – Cartmel, F. – Biggart, A. (2006): Choice biographies and transitional linearity: re-conceptualising modern youth transitions. *Revista de sociologia* 79(1): 225-239.

Furlong, A. – Cartmel, F. (2007): *Young People and Social Change*. McGraw-Hill Education Open University Press, Berkshire, England.

Galán, A. (2015): Digitális egyenlőtlenségek a 15–17 éves fiatalok körében – Településtípus és jövedelmi tényezők hatásvizsgálata. *Metszetek,* 4(1): 65-76. https://doi.org/10.18392/metsz/2015/1/5

Gallopin, G. C. (2006): Linkages between vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity. In *Global Environmental Change*, 16 (3): 293–303. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.02.004

Gazsó, F. (1997): A társadalmi folyamatok és a felsőoktatás. *Eszmélet*, 35(3): 85-95.

Gazsó F. – Laki L. (2004): *Fiatalok az újkapitalizmusban*. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó.

Gazsó, F. (2006): Társadalmi struktúra és iskolarendszer. In Kovách I. (szerk.): *Társadalmi metszetek. Hatalom, érdek, individualizáció és egyenlőtlenség a mai Magyarországon*. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 207-226.

Gábor, K. (2002): Magyar fiatalok és az iskolai ifjúsági korszak. Túl renden és osztályon? In Bauer B. – Szabó A. – Laki L. (szerk.): *Ifjúság 2000. Tanulmánykötet I*. Budapest: Nemzeti Ifjúságkutató Intézet, 13-29.

Gábor, K. (2003): A fiatalok sebezhetősége. In Gábor K. (szerk.) *Sebezhető ifjúság. Sebezhetőség az oktatásban, a munkavállalásban és a szabadidőben Európában*. Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 7-13.

Gábor, K. (2006): Társadalmi átalakulás és ifjúsági korszakváltás. In Gábor K. – Jancsák Cs. (szerk.): *Ifjúságszociológi*a. Szeged: Belvedere, 384–427.

Gábor, K. (2009): Ifjúsági korszakváltás. *Új Ifjúsági Szemle*, 5(4): 61-82.

Giddens, A. – Sutton, P. W. (2017): *Essential concepts in sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Harcsa, I. – Monostori, J. – Ceglédi, T. – Dabney – Fekete I. (2022): A nemzedékek közötti iskolai mobilitás mintázata és összefüggései az anyagi helyzettel. A reziliensek hátrányai a diploma után. *Socio.hu,* 2022(3). https://doi.org/10.18030/socio.hu.2022.3.4

Huszár, Á. (2022): Osztályszerkezet és jövedelemeloszlás Magyarországon 1982 és 2019 között. In Kolosi T. – Szelényi I. – Tóth I. Gy, (szerk.): *Társadalmi Riport 2022*. Budapest: TÁRKI, 159-173.

Jancsák, Cs. (2013): *Ifjúsági korosztályok korszakváltásban*. Budapest: Új Mandátum Kiadó.

Kaplan, H. B. (2002): Toward an understanding of resilience. In M. D. Glantz – J. L. Johnson (szerk.): *Resilience and development*, 17-83. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47167-1_3

Kende, Á. (2018): A roma gyerekek méltányos oktatását segítő programok lehetőségei az oktatási egyenlőtlenségek rendszerében *Socio.hu* 8(1): 144-162. https://doi.org/10.18030/socio.hu.2018.1.144

Kertesi, G. – Kézdi, G. (2013): *School Segregation, school choice and education policies in 100 Hungarian towns.* Budapest: Roma Education Fund.

Koltói, L. – Varga, Á. (2022): Digitális jelen – fiatalok IKT eszközök és közösségimédiahasználata társadalmi háttértényezők és a Covid 19 tükrében. In Nagy Á. (szerk.): *A lábjegyzeten is túl. Magyar Ifjúságkutatás 2020*. Budapest, Excenter Kutatóközpont, 291-328.

Köllő, J. (2022): Munkaerőpiaci következmények, In Horn D. – Bartal A. M. (szerk.) *Fehér könyv a COVID-19 járvány társadalmi gazdasági hatásairól.* Budapest: Eötvös Loránd Kutatási Hálózat Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont, Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet, 154-178.

Laki, L. (2006): Az ifjúság a magyar társadalomban. In Kovách I. (szerk.) *Társadalmi metszetek. Hatalom, érdek, individualizáció és egyenlőtlenség a mai Magyarországon*. Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 177-206.

Lannert, J. (1998): Közoktatás a kilencvenes években. In Kolosi T. – Tóth I. Gy. – Vukovich Gy. (szerk.): *Társadalmi riport 1998*. Budapest: TÁRKI, 361–387.

Loeber, R. – Hoeve, M. – Slot, N.W. – Van Der Laan, P.H (2012): *Persisters and Desisters in Crime from Adolescence into Adulthood. Explanation, Prevention and Punishment*. London, Routledge. 1-12.

Medgyesi, M. (2018): Fiatalok helyzete az EU-országokban a gazdasági válság idején és azt követően. In Kolosi T. – Tóth I. Gy. (szerk.): *Társadalmi Riport 2018*. Budapest, TÁRKI, 184-199.

Messing, V. (2017): Differentiation in the making: Consequences of school segregation of Roma in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. *European Education*, 49(1): 89-103. https://doi.org/10.1080/10564934.2017.1280336

Németh, R. (2006): A társadalmi mobilitás változásai Magyarországon a rendszerváltás folyamán. *Szociológiai Szemle,* 2006(4): 19–3.

Oktatási Hivatal (2016): *PISA 2015. Összefoglaló jelentés.* Budapest: Oktatási Hivatal

Oktatási Hivatal (2019): *PISA 2018. Összefoglaló jelentés*. Budapest: Oktatási Hivatal

Radó, P. (2018): A közoktatás szelektivitása mint a roma szegregáció általános kontextusa. In Fejes B. – Szűcs N. (szerk.): *Én vétkem. Helyzetkép az oktatási szegregációról*. Szeged: Motiváció Oktatási Egyesület, 31-56.

Rawlings S. E. – Hodgking, K. – Young, N. (2022): Student transitions to university in Wales: A mixed-method study of the enablers and barriers of first-year engagement. *International Journal of Educational Research Open* (3) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedro.2022.100216

Schwegler, G. (2021): Shifting inequalities in student lifestyles during the COVID-19 pandemic. Bulletin 157, *Suisse Sociological Association*, 31-35.

Székely, L. (2021a): A járvány nemzedéke – magyar ifjúság a koronavírus-járvány idején. In Székely L. (szerk.): *Magyar Fiatalok a koronavírus-járvány idején. Tanulmánykötet a Magyar Ifjúságkutatás 2020 eredményeiről.* Budapest: Enigma 2001 Kiadó és Médiaszolgáltató Kft, 9-32.

Székely, L. (2021b): A nagymintás ifjúságkutatás módszertana 2000-2020. In Székely L. (szerk.): *Magyar Fiatalok a koronavírus-járvány idején. Tanulmánykötet a Magyar Ifjúságkutatás 2020 eredményeiről.* Budapest: Enigma 2001 Kiadó és Médiaszolgáltató Kft, 257-274.

Tóth, P. (2018): Fogyasztás, kultúra, média, IKT, online lét, számítógépes játék. In Nagy Á. (szerk.): *Margón kívül - Magyar Ifjúságkutatás 2016*. Budapest, Excenter Kutatóközpont, 284-314.

Tóth, P. – Fekete, M. – Nagy, Á. (2022): Ki menti meg a világot? – Életeseményektől a Bolygó Kapitánya indexig. In Nagy Á. (szerk.) *A lábjegyzeten is túl. Magyar Ifjúságkutatás 2020*. Budapest: Szociális Demokráciáért Intézet – Excenter Kutatóközpont, 365-387.

Thurman, T. R. – Snider, L. A. – Boris, N. W. – Kalisa, E. – Nyirazinyoye, L. – Brown, L. (2008): Barriers to the community support of orphans and vulnerable youth in Rwanda. *Social Science & Medicine.* 66 (7): 557-1567.

Turner, B. S. (2008): Vulnerability. In W. A. Darity (Ed.), *International encyclopedia of the social sciences,* (8), 656–657.

Ugrai, J. (2020): Pürrhosz kapujában. A tudományok és az oktatás hazai kilátásai és a járvány adta esély. In: In: Fokasz N. – Kiss Zs. – Vajda J. (szerk.) *Koronavírus idején*. Budapest: Replika, 121-125.

Vehkalahti, K. – Armila, P. – Sivenius, A. (2021): Emerging Adulthood in the Time of Pandemic: The COVID-19 Crisis in the Lives of Rural Young Adults in Finland. In *Young*, (29)4: 399-416.

Xie, R. – Sen, B – Foster, E. M. (2014): Vulnerable Youth and Transitions to Adulthood. In Loeber, R (ed,) *Persisters and Desisters in Crime from Adolescence into Adulthood. Explanation, Prevention and Punishment.* London, Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1002/ace.20102

Appendix