



**MULTIDISZCIPLINÁRIS KIHÍVÁSOK
SOKSZÍNŰ VÁLASZOK**

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**AZ OROSZ ANYAORSZÁG, ÉS A MOSTOHA
MAGYARORSZÁG: AZ OROSZ MIGRÁNSOK ÚJ OTTHONA**

**MOTHER RUSSIA, STEPMOTHER HUNGARY: NEW
HOME FOR RUSSIAN MIGRANTS**

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Kulcsszavak: *Orosz migráció, globalizáció, nemzeti identitás, körkörös és visszatérő migráció,
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ÖSSZEFOGLALÓ

Bár a migráció kérdése nem új, mégis megújult figyelemmel kell vizsgáljunk, különösen ha a nemzeti érdek és a jövőbeli menekültek leírása és integrációja szempontjából tekintjük. Jelen tanulmány a modern orosz kivándorlás kihívásait veszi számba és a modern valóság realitásának kontextusában vizsgálja, és arra a kérdésre keresi a választ, hogy miért választják az oroszok Magyarországot, mint kivándorlási célpontot.

Jelen tanulmány a kivándorlás valós ösztönzőit és gátló tényezőit tárja fel, valamint azokat a képességeket, amelyekkel rendelkezniük kell az orosz kivándorlóknak annak érdekében, hogy be tudjanak illeszkedni a magyar társadalomba. Ezen kívül a globalizációs folyamattal kapcsolatban a tanulmány a körkörös és a visszatérő migráció, mint egy új "hibrid" migrációs forma kérdéseit vizsgálja, amelyben a végső célország nem előre meghatározott.

A tanulmány a megalapozott elméletre (grounded theory) épül a kutatás módszertani eszközeként pedig az interjút használja. A kutatás eredményeit a migrációkutatók és a döntéshozók is hasznosíthatják.

SUMMARY

The issue of migration is not new, but clearly requires renewed attention, especially when it comes to the national interest and the identification and integration of future migrants. This paper describes some of the problems of modern Russian emigration and offers an analysis, in the context of modern realities, as to why Russians choose to emigrate to Hungary.

This essay explores the real causes of "push" and "pull" factors and the ability or readiness of Russians who live in Hungary to be a part of the society. Additionally, considering the globalisation process, it examines circular and return migration as a new 'hybrid' form of migration in which the final destination cannot be assured.

The study uses the systematic methodology of grounded theory and interview and is a part of the dissertation. This research can be useful for either migration researchers or policymakers.

INTRODUCTION

The migration problem no longer seems new since the European migrant crisis (or European refugee crisis 2015) took place when the rising number of immigrants arrived in the EU for the purpose of asylum seeking or economic improvement of living standards (asylum-seekers, refugees or migrants). The EU faced challenges of uncontrolled migration (MRI, 2016) and as a result, the lack of coherent existence of multiculturalism and rising nationalism from country to country: "in this respect the Migration Crisis is one of the biggest humanitarian disasters since the Second World War, in the sense that it affected not only the targeted member States, mostly

Western, but the EU as a whole by showing the weakness and the feebleness of the European Project itself' (Apetroe, 2016, p.2).

Thus, it can be stated that globalization is the continuous, unstoppable process of worldwide economic, political, cultural, and religious integration. Simultaneously, it also served as and intensifier of national identity, tradition, economic protection tools. Hungary is no exception.

Hungary was one of those countries that refused to accept refugees, later the anti-migrant slogan was also traced in political campaigns. Despite tough policies towards migrants, a trend of more and more Russian-speaking migrants coming to Hungary could be noticed.

According to the United Nations migration statistics (1990-2019), the total number of immigrants in Hungary is 156,000. The top three trends for EU immigrants include Romania (86252), Germany (8179), Austria (2313). The top three trends in third-country immigrants include North Macedonia (20451), the Russian Federation (16919), Ukraine (1313) (UN DESA, 2019).

According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), Russian emigration grows steadily, registering a record level, where the number of Russians who immigrated to Hungary reached 5,264 (2020) (HCSO, 2022). The study also showed a significant gender imbalance with a preponderance of "female" migration. It is interesting that in the same year the number of Ukrainian migrants reached 30,316, which can play a rather important role in the formation of the possible diaspora of the 'Russian world' on the basis of a common spoken language, cultural background and values and religion (HCSO, 2022).

This was seen as a potential trigger against Russian-speaking migrants, especially given the recent history of the Soviet Union's dictatorship over Hungary. Several questions can be raised in regards to Russian emigration to Hungary: why do Russians emigrate to Hungary, if it is economically impractical at first glance? Can Russians integrate in Hungary and adapt to life in Hungary? Are Russian immigrants a threat to Hungarians in the context of national unity?

Answering these questions are challenged by the context of globalization and the fact that we must dig deep when looking for reasons. As part of the dissertation of the Russian emigration in Hungary, the interview method was chosen in the frame of grounded theory and the question was posed slightly different: *why do Russians emigrate to Hungary? What are their motives?*

From a theoretical point of view, this essay incorporates an idea of Douglas S. Massey that has recently received renewed consideration in studies on modern migration. Massey connected the phenomenon of migration with the industrial era and changes in socioeconomic trends (including the expansion of networks), global markets,

media and communication and with the availability and affordability of transport which gave rise to a new, hybrid form of migration in the modern globalized world (Massey, 1998). Furthermore, theories of neoclassical economics are also used in considering migrants as human capital circulating between countries.

The main goal of this essay is to provide a deeper view of Russian emigration in the frame of migration concepts and modern realities. It can be suitable both for researchers who lack material on the topic and for policymakers who may use the analysis and insight for developing a long-term strategy.

Grounded theory is taken as the basis of the methodology. This is a qualitative method of sociology which, using an interview or another selected approach, allows the researcher to generate hypotheses from the primary source (the interviewee) when there is a certain gap in the topic under study. The interview method is divided into cycles, each of which brings a new “theoretical sample”, passing through the stages of continuous comparison of information. Thus, a quantitative-qualitative study takes place, which allows the researcher to delve deeply into the problem, find its core and produce the missing material. This essay presents three samples (case studies) of the original ten variations in the data set (first round of sampling) aimed at finding the possible push and pull factors of Russian emigration.

It provides an outline of Russian emigration, its problems, stages of identification and the possible circulation of Russian immigrants between Hungary and Russia. It also raises the theoretical question of who can benefit from a given migration. At the end there are three stories of the first sample from ten interviews with Russian immigrants in Hungary, which provide answers to the question and a pre-hypothesis for the fifth wave of Russian emigration and its reason.

THE PROBLEMS OF RUSSIAN EMIGRATION STAGES IDENTIFICATION AND STUDY

Emigration and migration processes in different countries and political systems were generated by various socio-political shifts in history, as a rule, determined by any crisis states of society: political, economic, or other ones.

The history of Russia in the XX century is marked by a number of wars, conflicts, global historical changes, which entailed numerous migration processes abroad.

In the research literature of Russian emigration, several periods are distinguished. In sources studying the contribution of Russian emigrants and the formation of the culture of Russian emigration abroad, known as diaspora, three waves are most often distinguished: the first, caused by the Russian Revolution and the Civil War (1910-1920), the second, associated with the outcome of the Second World War (the 1940s)

and the third that followed the Cold War, so formally the strengthening of ideological dictatorship (from the late 1960s to the early 1980s) (Matveeva, 2017; Aleksenko, 2020).

Other researchers identify four waves of the Russian emigration, referring to the country's historical and political milestones (Aleksenko, 2020). So, the late period, the echo of the third wave, is described as a separate one (1986\1990-2000): “the complete collapse of the Soviet Union clearly marked a new period and a new reality for Russians and their ability to cross frontiers and national boundaries freely now referred to as “The Fourth wave”” (Beyer, 2013). Additionally, the fourth wave of Russian emigration is called “economic” (BBC News, 2012) since Russian emigrants were moving abroad not because of political persecution or repression, but due to the beginning of globalization, which made it possible to live in two countries.

A relatively new phenomenon is the ongoing fifth wave of Russian emigration, which falls on the XXI century and counted from the beginning of 2000. This period has not yet been sufficiently studied, but it has received important recognition from both society and the media. The fifth wave is being called the “emigration of disappointment” (Medvedev, 2019). There is a lot of controversy around this topic.

First case. Some argue that the cause of the fifth wave of emigration is the dictatorship of the Putin regime (Vladimirov et al, 2018), as a result, the reduction of rights and freedoms, the growth of repression, where the events on the Bolotnaya Square are an important milestone (Medvedev, 2019).

Second case. Others consider the “fifth wave” as the opportunity brought about by globalization and, as a consequence, believe that the migration of this period can be circular since many Russians leave in search of better opportunities but not yet ready to leave the Russian Federation once and forever (TASS, 2017).

Third case. In addition, there is a neutral point of view, that considers that the “fifth wave” emigration can't be called unambiguously political since the overwhelming majority have not been subjected to any persecution. However, it also claims that political motives undoubtedly influenced the decision of many (BBC News, 2012; Bushuev, 2019).

The other problem that raises both a theoretical and procedural challenge for migration is the statistical accountancy of migrants' track and movement. In migration research, the figures of total numbers of emigrants and immigrants help to analyze the scale of overall migration and the impact that it has on the countries of origin and destination.

At the moment, there are several sources of statistical information in the study of Russian emigration to foreign countries. These are: data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat); data from the Federal Migration Service of Russia; data

from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; expert assessments; data from national statistics of countries that received the main flows of migrants from Russia; data from international organizations such as the United Nation (UN), The International Organization for Migration (IOM), The International Labour Organization (ILO), The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), etc.

The problem is that there are considerable differences between the absolute and the relative indicators of migration (Palnikov, 2007; UNECE, 2011). The study “Demographic Challenges of Russia” showed that according to the statistics of the receiving countries, the number of immigrating Russians is many times higher than the statistics of emigrants.

According to the same source, “German estimate of migration from Russia exceeds Russian statistics by 22 times, while Spain counts Russian immigrants 28 times more than Russia, and Austria — 18 times. The number of Russians who have received immigration status in Canada is 46 times higher than the number, according to Russian data” (CSRHR, 2017, p.62). “This discrepancy is explained by the fact that statistics record the legal departure for permanent residences” (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2013, p.28).

In addition, there are countries where the official statistics do not even give a rough idea of the real scale of emigration. The list of such countries is noted by Palnikov, including the countries of Eastern Europe, Poland and Hungary. Data is provided within consideration of the migration terminology of waves chaos.

Thus, the problem of the fifth wave is that the true scope of emigration is many times greater than the official statistics given by Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service. The reason might be that the Russian side counts emigrants from the moment when a citizen of Russia, having moved to another country on a permanent basis and adopted the citizenship of that country, renounced the national passport given by birth. In the fourth wave of emigration, many Russian citizens hold two passports, since this neither contradict Russian legislation nor the legislation of the country that grants citizenship. In other cases when dual citizenship is prohibited in the country potentially rewarding the migrant with a national passport, the Russian migrant may decide in favor of the Russian passport and permanent documents for residence in the country of residence, depending on his/her identity, integration and own beliefs.

Considering this problem of accounting for emigrating Russians, Federal Law of May 31, 2002, N 62-FZ (as amended on July 13, 2020) “On Citizenship of the Russian Federation”, where Article 6 on dual citizenship, paragraph 3 states that a citizen of the Russian Federation who has second citizenship or a residence permit

in another country is obliged to submit a written notification of the presence of foreign documents to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation at the place of residence or place of actual stay in the Russian Federation (Konsul'tant Plyus. Nadezhnaya pravovaya podderzhka, 2020). On the one hand, this law will help eliminate the problem of inaccurate calculations of emigrating Russians, illegal emigration and immigration at the international level of cooperation, and on the other hand, it reminds of the vulnerability of those emigrating, considering the experience and political persecution of the First and Second waves of the Russian emigration.

Nevertheless, one might remember when debating the topic that migration is a natural part of the globalization process. However, migrants' movements are directed and behaviourally driven towards more attractive opportunities in terms of decent income, more interesting work, high-quality and affordable education, medical care, safe living, political freedoms, etc.

The impact and consequences of the fifth wave as emigration can be seen as a serious challenge for Russia. However, the question is if it can be beneficially seen by host-countries?

CIRCULAR AND RETURN MIGRATION

The different views of the statistic problem may also be justified by *de jure* and *de facto* migration cases. If the fifth wave of emigration is seen as one of the advantages of globalization and it does contradict one of the versions, namely that the nature of Russian emigration is related to 'Putin's dictatorship' and political prosecution (first case), then it's possible to see it as a circular or repeat migration.

In the absence of a clear definition, it is unclear how this type of migration differs from other well-studied forms of temporary or seasonal movements. The following definitions can be found among the proposed circular migration/migrant terminology:

- Changing the place of residence of a migrant between a country of origin and a destination country on legal or illegal bases until the final settlement due to age or family reunion (Bustamante, 2002).
- Return of a migrant to a sending country one or several times over a period of time (O'Neil, 2003).
- The third-country nationals settled and working in the EU but wishing to start an activity in a country of origin or the third-country national that reside outside the EU that wishing to come to the EU for temporarily work, study,

training or a combination of all mentioned before re-establishing back to a country of origin (European Commission, 2007).

- A repetition of legal migration between two and more countries (EMN, 2011).
- IOM defines circular migration as “the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries of origin and destination” (IOM, 2011, p.19);
- A person, i.e. migrant that has dual household membership (Posel & Marx, 2013).
- Repeated travel or movement between different destinations (Schneider & Parusel, 2015).

A more or less ordered understanding of circular migration can be found in Fargues’ work. According to his typology, there can be several types and criterion of circular migration: temporary residence (time-limited permits); possibility for renewal (multiple entries into a destination country); circularity and freedom of movements between a country of origin and a host country during each period of stay; legality; migrants’ rights protection; labour demand and satisfaction in a destination country with possibly additional criterion of suiting labour market needs, migrants’ skills upgrade, transfer of knowledge and skills to the country of source in order to mitigate the effect of the brain drain (Fargues, 2008).

The terminology does not account for varying practices among countries which often include their own definition and approach. This makes establishing the definition of circular migration challenging.

In this regard, it can be noted that migration in both cases of immigration and emigration is not seen as a problem, but rather a win-win strategy, where human capital is seen as an advantage in the destination country since it can have control over migrants’ stay and permits issue, pension and social security, mobility partnership with a sending country.

For sending countries, benefits can be found in unburdening the national economy, including jobs; retraining, improving and circulation of skills, partnerships with a host country, trade and investment networks.

Gains for migrants themselves can be found in a variety of options and flexibility since they are not committed to definitive return, legal circularity and mobility, enhancement, retaining and application of skills, the establishment of networks,

community development, possible institutional improvement (Dayton-Johnson, 2007).

The study showed that “for the period from 2002 to 2010 the number of [Russian] emigrants with higher education who left [Russia] for permanent residence has almost halved, and, conversely, the number of those who left for temporary employment has doubled” (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2013, p.26).

Formally or “de jure”, more and more Russians regard emigration as a temporary phenomenon rather than a permanent one. Many people retain their housing, social network and contact, registration and other documents confirming the status of a migrant in their homeland in Russia (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2013).

“Post factum”, it can turn out that temporary or circular migration and residence in the country of destination goes into the final decision of emigration.

However, there are also informal cases, or “de facto”, when an emigrant maintains social contacts and network in one’s homeland, but at the same time does not plan to return (Ryazantsev & Pismennaya, 2013).

Finally, another important term in addition to the circular migration is the *spontaneous circular migration* that “refers to people who decide themselves whether or not to migrate to a different country, about the length of their stay, and whether or not, and when, to return to their country of origin, and eventually migrate again” (UNECE, 2016, p.4).

This is an important concept, which can show how the possibilities of globalization and circular migration can create some competition between countries for human capital in relation to high-skilled migrants.

Even though migration is still a more individual and psychological decision of an individual, one should not forget about the competitive nature of globalization.

Considering the varieties of notions related to migration and the absence of a single, generally accepted definition of circular migration, one can refer only to the characteristic features of both the theoretical concept and the tendencies of the fifth wave of the Russian emigration, such as:

- 1) temporality and repetition of movements across the border for the purpose of employment and/or education;
- 2) Anti-cyclicity and the possibility of the spontaneity of such migration movements;
- 3) A tool for migration, development and cooperation, which is a win-win situation for both countries and a migrant.
- 4) The legality of migration, which is determined and regulated by laws, policies and international agreements between the sending and receiving countries (Bara et al., 2012).

However, if the decision to emigrate is initially and fundamentally based and is influenced by *the first or third case*, where political instability and infringement of human rights take place, then most likely the Russian emigrant can take advantage of the opportunities of globalization in order to eventually emigrate from the country of birth (Russian Federation) to the destination-country (Hungary, Germany or elsewhere).

In this case, it is important to note that the Russian emigrant will have to face the process of integration and naturalization, given the fact that both countries in the context assume local language proficiency, knowledge of history and laws for the adoption or integration of citizenship as the endpoint of emigration. Although if there is a permanent residence permit, then the conditions for integration are more simplified.

It should also be noted that an important criterion for the residence of a migrant on his/her final decision is the issue of taxation. By where the emigrant/ immigrant pays taxes, one can determine one's administrative and legal involvement in the welfare of the country in which the migrant settles.

In addition, even assuming a likely change in the political and economic situation both in Russia and in the world as a whole, it can be mentioned that circular migration empowers the migrant with the ability to choose their country of residence based on the most favourable conditions, with full consideration of the legal nature of migration and policies of both sending and receiving countries.

Thus, considering the possible outcome for three parties, namely the migrant (1) and his/her welfare that constitutes a part of welfare of one of the countries, the country of birth Russia (2) and the destination-country, in this case, Hungary (3) in terms of movable human capital on behalf of a migrant (1), one can build a theoretical "gain" and "loss" system.

"GAIN" AND "LOSS" MIGRATION SYSTEM

In the context of international migration, the issue of "gain" and "loss" is quite a debate. The question "who benefits from migration?": the sending country, the receiving country or the immigrant herself\himself is still open due to a number of changing factors. These include demographic considerations, the time frame of migration, the skills and qualifications of the migrant, the economies of both countries, their legal regulatory frameworks surrounding migration and even identity politics and approaches on integration.

Some scholars are inclined to believe that emigration or immigration brings neither “gain” nor “loss” to those who left and those who remain in the country of emigration. Grubel and Scott propose the following: “if a person is paid his true marginal social product, his emigration leaves unchanged the incomes of those remaining in the country from which he leaves, except for the redistributive effects of government taxation and spending” (1968, p.545).

Another group of researchers suggests that high-skilled emigrants lower the growth of the welfare of the country of emigration (Johnson, 1967; Lundborg, 2006).

The more negative impact in terms of loss and a proposed tax on emigration can be found in the context of brain drain by Bhagwati and Hamada. Further, the negative impact has been reformulated by the new growth theorists (Miyagiwa, 1991; Haque & Kim, 1995; Wong & Yip, 1999).

On the contrary, it was suggested that human capital can be fostered in prospects of supporting country growth, in case education abroad is of a higher standard than at the country of origin, so the possibility for return migration may promote further growth and development (Stark et al., 1997; Domingues Dos Santos & Postel-Vinay, 2003), as well as entrepreneurial activities and trade networks (Dustmann & Kirchkamp, 2002).

Perhaps one of the most comprehensive analyses is presented in Panagariya’s article “Migration: Who Gains, Who Loses”, where the author considers the migration process as the complex phenomenon, respectively considering one-good, a two-factor model that describes an economic process between the “source country” and “the host country” with the one-way flow of human capital (a high or low-skilled migrant). According to the author, the migrant generally benefits, although the gain of other parties, referred to as countries, depend on certain factors. Under the circumstances of a small volume migration if the migrant does not own any capital either before or after migration, countries and their population is not altered.

However, if it is finite migration, then it affects the welfare of both countries and it is generally considered that it causes a loss for the sending country and gain for the native population of the host country. This phenomenon followed by income redistribution (Panagariya, 2006).

To sum up, the above-mentioned literature review shows the relevance of the problem under study and is a provocation of thought for further research.

However, it is important to note that these purely economic theories imply a theoretical probability that can hardly be applied to practical migration, which includes many aspects, ranging from the aims and reasons of migration, for example, family reunification, which changes the system of “game” & “loss” in general since it involves a demographic aspect as well.

In the exclusive context of this discipline, it can be emphasized that in most cases the research is aimed at highly skilled migrants and rarely mentions the effect of low-skilled migration and illegal migration in general.

Additionally, given the dates of writing the theoretical material, they do not consider the transformation of the labour market and changes in the digital economy.

THREE STORIES OF RUSSIAN IMMIGRANTS IN HUNGARY

Story 1. Political emigration

Elena Z.¹ emigrated from Russia to Slovakia in 2015 for political reasons, having received a temporary residence permit in Slovakia to study the Slovak language (type of visa: other). Today Elena has a permanent residence permit in Slovakia, she has opened her own business. In 2021, she moved to Budapest, Hungary. Single, no kids. Before moving, she was a member of the “Writers’ Case” in the media known as the “Markvo’s Case”. In Moscow, Elena held one of the highest positions at Bureau 17, a company that organized cultural and educational events in Moscow. The company repeatedly won tenders and financial support from the Moscow government for the implementation of creative projects, including one of the largest projects “Books in the Park”, a series of public lectures held in Moscow parks, which brought together all contemporary writers and artists with diverse socio-political views.

In 2014 on the website of one of the Russian media outlets, LifeNews, the publication was made titled "The Kremlin secretly financed Navalny" (Life, 2014). It claimed to have evidence of covert support of the opposition by the Russian authorities. In the publication the company Bureau 17 and its director Alexandrina Markvo were accused of embezzling more than 100 million rubles in total in 2010-2014. The article also indicates that Bureau 17 was involved in the case because the owner of the company, Alexandrina Markvo, was the common-law wife of activist Vladimir Ashurkov, an associate of Navalny (Life, 2014).

Later on, an investigation started and claimed, in particular, that Markvo’s company stole the funds allocated for the “News from the Classics” literary competition and prizes for the winners, as well as for the popularization of reading in Moscow parks. It was also highlighted that famous writers who sympathize with the opposition took part in the events organized by Alexandrina Markvo, Dmitry Bykov, Lev Rubinstein, Boris Akunin (BBC, 2015).

The Investigative Committee called for an investigation of all employees, and the head of the company was put on the wanted list and a trial was carried out in absentia.

¹*Elena would like to remain anonymous*

Alexandra Markvo emigrated to London with her common-law husband. Many workers also decided to emigrate, whether they applied for the political refugee is unknown.

Elena Z. was frightened by the persecution in connection with her position in the company and decided to emigrate to Slovakia for the purpose of studying (visa type: other).

Since her emigration, she has repeatedly returned to Russia and was subject to interrogations. In 2020, the Markvo's case was officially closed, but Elena does not want to return to Russia and is not going to.

During her emigration, she was able to integrate into Slovak society (indicator: language and knowledge of culture), gain financial independence without using the labour market in Slovakia (the owner of a business registered in Slovakia). Elena's motive for moving to Hungary is connected with her love for the country and the social circle she has built in Budapest. Additionally, she purchased a real estate property in Budapest, Hungary.

She is a first-generation emigrant, determined to integrate into Hungarian society through starting a business and studying Hungarian culture. She does not speak Hungarian at the moment but she is planning to study in the future. She finds cultural and intellectual characteristics of Hungarians and Russians quite similar, given that in Russia she was part of a more intellectual circle. In Slovakia however, she found herself in the social circle of students and factory workers. In Hungary, she most of all appreciates the presence of a varied cultural program, including theatre, opera, musical observatories. In Hungarians, she appreciates liveliness, intelligence and an active lifestyle.

I expected that in an interview Elena would be quite negatively opposed to the Russian government, which is more reminiscent of the first wave of emigres who dreamed of returning to their homeland, but subject to a change of government to a more liberal one, while being a patriot of their country, not considering the country of emigration for a long-term basis. The second counter-expectation relates to one of the most significant elements of the framework of the fifth wave of emigration, which is the unrestrained and voluntary nature of emigration. Emigrating from Russia, people seem to be in search of a better life (economic, political, etc.). Elena's case showed that yes, in Russia there are prerequisites for political emigration, direct and indirect, but modern emigrants (so far Elena's case) show that they are ready to 'invest' or give back to societies where they establish their life, so 'if you are in a tribe, then be a part of the tribe'. An interesting conclusion follows from this which is that, while identifying themselves as Russian emigrants, they are cosmopolitan or 'global Russians', which might be a part of personality or identity that allows them to

integrate into any society of the world. Also, starting from the thought of the tribe, one can think about the concept of a digital nomad since Elena's business is managed remotely.

Story 2. Student emigration

Elizaveta is a perfect example of a circulating emigrant. Elizaveta first came to Hungary in 2017 for several semesters on the Stipendium Hungaricum exchange program when she was 22 years old. At the same time, she does not hide her intentions, and mentioned that she came to Hungary because of the possibility of travel within the European Union. After completing the exchange program, Elizaveta returned home to Russia, but during her studies she fell in love with another student, Jordanian nationality, which was a decisive factor for her to start a doctoral program in Hungary and return here in 2018.

Elizaveta responds rather negatively about the political systems of both countries, Hungary and Russia. She has a low level of integration in Hungary and a complete lack of desire to deepen into the country's history, traditions, and language.

Her main social circle in Hungary is made up of migrants of Arab or Russian origin. She also avoids celebrating Hungarian holidays with the exception of Carnival (*Farsang*). In general, she speaks of Hungarian mentality rather negatively.

After completing her studies in Hungary, she plans to move to another European country, because she suggests Hungary's possible exit from the European Union, and also notes low salaries.

When asked why she decided to emigrate from Russia, she refers to her relationship with and negative views on politics in Russia. She notes her contribution to Hungarian society in research work. In addition, Elizaveta has confirmed that her economic well-being is better in Hungary than in Russia but suggests that it could be even better if she moves to another [more economically prosperous] country.

Story 3. From student to Hungarian wife

Nadia's story is truly impressive. Back in 2009 Nadia came to Hungary for studies at Central European University one of the most liberal universities. That time she joined a program of gender studies. In her interview, one can see how her worldview and social reality changed with her education. In 2010 she returned to Russia and 'old reality' served as a cultural shock. She no longer felt like a Russian, but a foreigner. The European value of freedom was contrasted with Russian realities. Here we can trace the change in her identity under the influence of European society. For example, she did not share Russian values in creating a family in the early years

of her life. At the same time, Nadya did not express opposition or negative views on Russian politics or life in general. Moreover, she has always been apolitical.

Nadya realized that she wanted to leave Russia and started looking for work abroad, without being attached to Hungary. It happened by chance that using her Russian social circle, she was able to return to Hungary as a migrant in circulation and later marry a Hungarian and start a family in Hungary. Her case shows full integration into Hungarian society.

Nadia speaks Hungarian at a high level, takes part in public life in Hungary, including national holidays and elections. She knows Hungarian history very well. Moreover, over the years of her life in Hungary, she developed Hungarian patriotism and admits that she feels resentment when one of the migrants speaks badly about Hungary. She is currently married and has three children. Nadia works for a Hungarian company.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that, in the case of Russian emigration, clear “push” and “pull” factors such as environmental, economic, cultural or socio-political have not been identified in current research, there are still reasons to believe that the fifth wave is at least partially triggered by social and political factors. Two out of three cases of qualitative analyses showed the presence of a political motive in the cause of emigration, while the third case showed a social one.

It should also be noted that currently, with the exception of forced migration, the basis for migration is considered to be the conscious will or desire of a person to change his or her place of residence (temporarily or permanently). This also includes the needs and possibilities that can be seen as the absence of serious barriers to migration, as may have been the case prior to globalization. Thus, it can be assumed and “pre-hypothesised”, that many Russian emigrants are not in search of job opportunities abroad but rather intend to move or re-create their business. With regard to the gains and losses in the migration system, it can be noted that two cases out of three are beneficial for Hungary: Elena owns her own business and Nadia is a Hungarian citizen, so has every right to access the labour market without restrictions.

It is interesting to note that, in all three stories, the reason why Russians move to Hungary lies plainly on the surface: Hungary is ‘the heartland’ of Europe and offers easy access to other EU countries, good living conditions and a reasonably developed Russian network, which is opposed to diaspora since the diverse groups available for building connections are not exclusively Russian-speaking.

Additionally, in the first and third cases, the motivation and intention to integrate partially removes the assumption that the Russians may be a threat to Hungarian national unity. The second case shows an advantageous situation for both parties since the immigrant does not want to integrate into Hungarian society because they do not consider Hungary as a country for permanent residence. So, one can assume that it will be the case of “return” or “transit” migration.

These three cases give a view on ongoing migration, which will probably continue to increase, following the trend shown in the Hungarian statistics, but this does not mean that Russian immigrants in Hungary will permanently settle in the country. That is why Hungary needs to find a mutually beneficial balance to keep Russian emigrants in the country based on the needs of both parties. For example, if Hungary needs more intellectual workers, then it can create a favourable policy with further cultural courses for integration. If it needs to change the demographic situation, then it could attract more young, single Russian women to come to Hungary. For business – tax stimulation could be introduced, which is what I perceive to be a convenient situation for both parties and how Hungary can become “stepmother” for the “sons” and “daughters” of Russia.

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