Hungarian Philosophical Review

Modalities

László Bernáth, János Tőzsér — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

On October 27, 2023, the conference entitled Modalities was organized by the Department of Theory of Knowledge of the Institute of Philosophy of the HUN-REN Humanities Research Center. The Focus column of this issue of the Hungarian Philosophical Review contains, with the exception of the study by Tibor Sutyák, the written version of the presentations from the above conference.

Possibilities and Possible Worlds

Ferenc Huoranszki — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper argues that reference to possible worlds cannot help us to understand the nature of de re possibilities. The only context in which reference to worlds is helpful indeed is the study of modal inferences, but in that context, worlds are only formal devices. For this reason, fundamental questions in the metaphysics of modality should not concern the nature and existence of such worlds. The paper also argues that the possible world account of possibility is ultimately based on the idea of recombinability and Hume’s dictum against necessary connections between distinct existences, neither of which can help explain or determine what is possible and what is not. Possibilities should then be understood with reference to persons’, objects’ and their systems’ abilities or capacities, and no with worlds. All this does not mean that we should reject possible worlds. But whether we should postulate them or not must be decided by our best physics and its philosophical interpretation, not by metaphysics. If the best interpretation of quantum mechanics does indeed, as some claim, make essential use of such worlds, then they must be admitted in our ontology as any other objects to which theoretical terms refer.

Modal intuitions and possible worlds

László Kocsis — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In developing philosophical theories, almost all philosophers accept and use metaphilosophical principles and beliefs, not always explicitly stated, which relate to the nature and aims of philosophical theories. In this paper, I try to present certain elements of Lewis’s modal metaphysics as fitting well into the metaphilosophical vision he adopts. I am convinced that an important pillar of Lewisian realism about possible worlds is to be found in his philosophical methodology, in the theoretical conservatism which holds that we must respect our commonsense intuitions in philosophical theorizing. After a brief introduction to Lewis’s metaphilosophy, I consider two modal intuitions, one concerning the contingency of physics and the other concerning about the possibility of alien properties and alien worlds, and his attempts to preserve them in the metaphysics of modality. I show that these attempts have largely determined why Lewis developed the
metaphysical view that is most attacked precisely because it is counterintuitive.

Counterfactuals first, world dominance next?

Dániel Kodaj — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The paper discusses the „counterfactuals-first” approach (CF) to modality, which has been championed by Timothy Williamson. CF grounds modality, or at least its logic and epistemology, in counterfactual conditionals. As Williamson points out, judgments like “If the sugar cube were dropped in water, it would melt” are prior to modal metaphysics and they deeply permeate our everyday thinking. Using some fairly straightforward logical principles, counterfactuals give rise to a version of normal modal logic if we identify necessity with absolute counterfactual stability (Necessarily P ≡ Whatever were the case, P would be true). Since global scepticism about everyday counterfactual judgments seems unwarranted, CF undermines the objection, often voiced in connection with possible worlds, that metaphysical modality is epistemically inaccessible. I argue that despite its advantages in epistemology and logic, CF cannot easily replace worlds
in the metaphysics of modality, because it either presupposes worlds or it must make comparably costly ontological assumptions.

Possible Worlds and Fictional Worlds

Tibor Bárány — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

It seems almost self-evident that narrative works of art tell possible stories. But is it worth taking the concept of the “possible world” at face value and claiming that we can account for the “world” of narrative fiction through the concept of possible worlds (as developed in modal semantics)? According to David Lewis’s famous paper, Truth in fiction (1978/1983), the answer is yes. In this paper, I will present Lewis’s analysis in detail and argue that we can only fully evaluate its strengths and weaknesses by paying careful attention to two key restrictions that Lewis imposes on theories seeking to account forthe intuitive truth conditions of sentences used paratextually (i.e. to report on what goes on in a fiction). His own theory meets both requirement, Non-triviality (“the analysis should avoid delineating the range of possible worlds by relying on the concept of ‘truth in fiction’”) and Possibility-Fictionality Asymmetry (“the analysis should avoid including
the actual world among the relevant possible worlds”), but Lewis pays a heavy theoretical price to satisfy them. The technical solution he employs to ensure their fulfillment ultimately results in the model, in certain cases, misidentifying the range of truths of artistic narrative fictions. Lewis does not address this issue, as he apparently does not consider the Interpretative Asymmetry constraint binding (“the analysis must be sensitive to the difference in the nature of the inferences underlying the interpretation of literary texts and other types of narrative texts”). In this paper, I will show that Non-triviality and Interpretative Asymmetry cannot be satisfied simultaneously. If we insist on Non-triviality, our analysis will fail to adequately capture the specificities of artistic fiction, though the possible-world discourse will still offer some explanatory power – this is the solution Lewis adopts. Conversely, if we prioritize Interpretative Asymmetry, the concept of “possible worlds” will not do any real explanatory work in the theory, though the analysis will be sensitive to the unique aspects of literary narratives—this is the path taken by the authors of post-Lewis theories of fiction.

Relevant Possibility

Tibor Sutyák — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In this essay, I put forward the following statements: 1) there is a difference between the general and relevant concepts of possibility. Most philosophical approaches deal with general possibility, which is the dual concept of the equally general, global necessity; 2) the basic experience of possibility and necessity is different: while by necessity we really mean its global variant, the most natural concept of possibility is a local type of possibility bound to a given situation, i.e. the relevant possibility; 3) the standard philosophical interpretation of modality, the model of possible worlds based on a combinatorial approach, cannot provide a satisfactory analysis of the relevant concept of possibility, the Aristotelian concept and its contemporary versions need to be supplemented; 4) the relevant possibility can be adequately approached in terms of Situation Theory; 5) the relevant possibility can be interpreted as change-compatibility and relevance-receptivity between situations.

What is the relationship of physical and empirical possibility?

Balázs Gyenis — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

I argue that physical and nomic possibility, traditionally understood, do not align with Norton’s (2022) concepts of empirical, hypothetical, or counterfactual possibility. Instead, physical and nomic possibility are special cases of Norton’s broadly construed concept of logical possibility. I illustrate my claims by showing how certain examples of physical possibility – such as the existence of a completely empty world, initial value
indeterminism, time travel, and what I call radical freedom of acting otherwise - are evaluated differently under Norton’s account. I achieve this by generalizing Norton’s empirical, hypothetical, and counterfactual possibilities into a unified concept of conditional inductive possibility.

The Modal Interpretation of Quantum Theory

Gábor Szabó — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The paper presents the modal interpretation of quantum theory. The modal interpretation is special since in other classical physical theories and in other interpretations of quantum theory the synchronous states of the system are fixed once and for all, in the modal interpretation of quantum theory, however, the set of synchronous possibilities can vary in time. Thus, unlike in other theories, in the modal interpretation the evolution of the system does not govern the actual state, but the set of possible states.

The problem of moral over-demandingness and the philosophy of vocation

Barnabás Ágota — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The main question of the paper is how one can simultaneously accept both that moral obligations impose categorical demands on individuals across all areas of life, regardless of their personal preferences, and that agents have the right to follow their own preferences in many aspects of life. My hypothesis is that this question can be addressed through the concept of vocation, as this integrates both the categorical nature of morality and the significant role of individual preferences in life choices. After outlining the problem of moral over-demandingness, I introduce the concept of vocation, explore its possible interpretations, and examine the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches. Since the concept of vocation first emerged within the Judeo-Christian tradition, my analysis begins with the theistic understanding of vocation. I then present the general characteristics of the concept before turning to secular theories. The conclusion of the paper is that only theistic theories have thus far been able to adequately address the problem of over-demandingness by providing a clear explanation of the source and relationship between morality and vocation. Secular theories, on the other hand, either remain unclear on this point or establish a relationship between the two that excessively diminishes the normative weight of either morality or vocation.

Aristotle on Helping the Poor

Gergely Mohay — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

I was primarily interested in what Aristotle thought about the reasons for helping others, whether he considered it possible to help from altruistic motives, and what he thought about the right measure and way of helping. I examined three interdependent topics of Aristotle: community, liberality and friendship. These topics illuminate the same issue from various angles, and give a unified picture of the relationship between the individual and the community, the individual and another person, and about the different aspects one takes into consideration while helping others. Additionally, I drew some comparisons between the Aristotelian view and other ancient conceptions.

Philosophy and Contemplation

Tamás Pavlovits — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This paper explores the concept of contemplation in the tradition of philosophical thought. It seeks to answer the question whether there is a specifically philosophical concept of contemplation, i.e. whether it is possible to define a concept of contemplation that is distinct from contemplative religious practices. In answering this question in the affirmative, the analysis seeks to support three basic claims: (1) philosophical contemplation is a practice that is an integral part of philosophy without being directly aimed at generating theory; (2) philosophical contemplation is a specific form of thinking, which is for this very reason distinct from contemplative religious practices that define themselves in opposition to thinking; (3) although the principle and orientation of philosophical contemplation differ in antiquity and modern thought, philosophical contemplation remains identical in nature and practice. Because of this identity, it can be said to be an
integral part of the practice of philosophy today. In the course of the analysis, the paper discusses philosophical contemplation from two perspectives, that of ancient metaphysics and that of modern phenomenology, which allows us to reveal common features of this practice independent of the epochs.

Is the Will Always Free? A Non-Restrictivist Theory of Free Will

Péter Tamás Sági — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The aim of the paper is to show that indirect and restrictive theories of free will face several serious problems. Therefore, it is preferable to choose a direct, non-restrictive theory from the libertarian approaches. I highlight five major problems with restrictivism that vividly illustrate the flaws of such theories. Of course, every philosopher’s theory is different, but it seems that all restrictivist theories encounter at least one of these five
weaknesses. For this reason, the conclusion of the paper is that those who adopt a libertarian approach to free will should advocate a non-restrictive position.

Introduction to St. Augustine’s De immortalitate animae and his chapter Retractrationes in Corpus Christianorum

Kevin Scheffer — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In point of my PhD research I’m focusing on St. Augustine’s philosophy on the soul. As a part of this research I translated Augustine’s early work De immortalitate animae to Hungarian. My goal is to make this work of Augustine more attainable for the hungarian publicity. For this I also wrote an introductory study concerning De immortalitate animae in general and some of my conceptions about it. I hope it will also contribute to the
Hungarian reception of St. Augustine.

Bernáth’s Theistic Arguments: Psychophysical Harmony and Moral Knowledge

Bálint Békefi — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

The fourth chapter of László Bernáth’s book Létezik-e szabad akarat? [Does free will exist?] briefly formulates two theistic arguments: namely, those from psychophysical harmony and moral knowledge. This response argues first that these arguments are essentially independent of the issue of free will and can be formulated without reference to it with no loss in plausibility. Second, the paper considers how these fundamentally abductive arguments involving philosophical cost-benefit analysis fit into Bernáth’s broader anti-Bayesian and transcendental approach to epistemology.

Post-Modern Metaphysics

Gergely Ambrus — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

A review of the monograph Túl a modern metafizikán [Beyond Modern Metaphysics] by Ferenc Huoranszki.

Freedom Captured: Paradoxes and Contradictions

Boldizsár Eszes — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In his book Does Free Will Exist?, László Bernáth uses the method of phenomenological conservatism to arrive at his moderate libertarian position on free will. The disagreement with the progressive scientist metaphysician, who holds the opposite position, is that it remains insoluble with the usual reasoning technique, and therefore we can only get out of the resulting impasse by reflecting on our epistemic norms and situation. In this article I try to show that this is not the only way forward; however, following the path I
have proposed, because of the contradictions and paradoxes that arise along the way, the conservative metaphysician cannot, in my view, maintain his claim that his proposal is a rational solution to the problem of free will.

The Worlds of Possibility

Dániel Kodaj — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

A review of the volume Lehetséges világok [Possible Worlds] edited by László Kocsis and Ádám Tamás Tuboly.

Freedom for the Zombies!

Miklós Márton — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In this paper, I analyze and criticize some of the most important elements of László Bernáth’s concept of free will and its existence, as it has appeared in his work “Does Free Will Exist?”. First, I argue that the concept of free will does not imply phenomenal consciousness, i.e. that unconscious free decisions can exist. On this basis, in the following sections of the text I will criticize Bernáth’s argumentative strategy of arguing for the existence of free will by relying on the methodological principle of phenomenological conservatism and the phenomenology of the inner experience of certain volitional decision situations. For if it is not an essential element of the concept of free will that such situations are phenomenally conscious, then one cannot argue for or against their existence solely leaning on the phenomenology of such experiences. Finally, I argue
against Bernáth’s conception of the debate around free will as if it were constituted by the irresolvable opposition between a metaphysical conservative position, which takes the phenomenology of inner experience seriously, and a metaphysical progressivist position, which relies on empirical science rather than inner experience. Rather than presenting a picture of a hopeless struggle between these irreconcilable positions, or even worldviews, I will conclude the paper by suggesting a more optimistic picture, one that
trusts in the strength of rational arguments.

Costs and Risks

Kristóf Váncza — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In my paper, I formulate three problems and objections to László Bernáth’s book Does Free Will Exist? I argue that (1.) Bernáth makes a methodological error in his argument by failing to address in sufficient depth the fact that his own position necessarily implies theism. (2.) The phenomenon of conscience is on much more unstable ground than it could be the basis for the anthropology and ethics it is supposed to underpin. (3.) It is not
true that, of the parties engaged in the irresolvable debate on free will, Bernáth’s position is objectively more rational.

The Risk of Freedom

László Bernáth — Tue, 20 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000

In this paper, I respond to the objections raised by Bálint Békefi, Boldizsár Eszes, Miklós Márton, and Kristóf Váncza against my book Létezik-e szabad akarat? [Does Free Will Exist?].