A priori tudás a hitek etikájáról

Absztrakt

In this paper, I argue that one is epistemically entitled to hold the belief that she is able to somewhat reliably differentiate between mental processes which justify beliefs and those that cannot. Furthermore, I attempt to show that one can know apriori that she is epistemically entitled to hold such a belief. I propose a modified version of the so-called weak transcendental arguments, which try to show that any skeptic who refuses this or that fundamental proposition runs into practical contradictions. Although its form is rather similar, my argument is much less ambitious. Instead of showing that the skeptic has to be self-contradicting, I attempt to show only that the skeptical challenge has no normative force at all if one does not accept the truth of some fundamental propositions; for instance, the truth of the proposition that one is able to somewhat reliably differentiate between mental processes which justify beliefs and those that cannot.